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A Study of Due Process Requirements
n Administrative Investigations-I
The growing trend toward the enforcement of statutory
and quasi-statutory law through administrative investiga-
tions raises serious questions involving the constitutional
rights of persons subpoenaed to appear before government
investigators. In this installment of his three-part Article,
Mr. Rogge discusses the investigative practices and pro-
cedures of federal governmental agencies, focusing pri-
marily on administrative subpoena powers and the right
to counsel of subpoenaed persons. He concludes that to a
certain extent our accusatorial method, represented by the
grand jury, has been replaced by the inquisitional system
developed in continental Europe. In the subsequent in-
stallments, Mr. Rogge will examine the procedures of
various state investigators and investigative bodies that
have the benefit of subpoena powers and, on the basis of
this study of both federal and state agencies, suggest cer-
tain necessary due process requirements.
0. John Rogge*
In a 1924 decision, FTC v. American Tobacco Co.,' the United
States Supreme Court refused to enforce a Federal Trade Com-
mission order requiring a private corporation to produce its busi-
ness records for inspection because the order failed to show prob-
able cause. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court,
decisively stated:
anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth
Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to au-
thorize one of its subordinate agencies . . . to direct fishing expedi-
tions into private papers.2
* Member of the New York Bar
1. 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
2. Id. at 305-06.
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Yet recently, in CAB v. Hermann,3 the Court reinstated a federal
district court order enforcing a Civil Aeronautics Board subpoena
duces tecum over the subpoenaed person's request for an adver-
sary hearing to determine the relevancy of the subpoenaed ma-
terial. The Court, per curiam, impliedly affirmed the broad rele-
vancy criterion of the district court without even considering the
constitutional rights of the persons subject to investigation as raised
in FTC v. American Tobacco Co.
Other recent Supreme Court decisions indicate acceptance of the
broad powers of investigation now exercised by governmental of-
ficials, both state and federal, but fail to determine the rights guar-
anteed to persons subpoenaed for investigative purposes. For ex-
ample, in In re Groban4 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
an Ohio statute that failed to grant the right to counsel in an in-
vestigative hearing before a state fire marshal, reasoning that
the subpoenaed person's right to counsel was no greater than be-
fore a grand jury. Also, in Hannah v. Larche,6 the Court upheld
the procedural rules of the Commission on Civil Rights against a
claim that the rules violated the due process clause by denying wit-
nesses a fair hearing, determining that the fact-finding, non-
adjudicatory nature of the Commission's investigations permitted a
relaxation of constitutional guarantees. Justices Black and Doug-
las, dissenting in both Groban and Hannah v. Larche, opposed the
majorities' comparison of an administrative investigation to a grandjury proceeding, arguing that the danger of misuse of official pow-
er, inherent in secret investigations, is dispelled by the presence of
responsible citizens on the grand jury and concluding that since
criminal prosecutions might follow administrative investigations,
due process requires that the parties be granted the right to coun-
sel.
On January 3, 1963, in Mead Corp.,' the Federal Trade Com-
mission entered an order giving persons subpoenaed to appear at
nonpublic investigative hearings greater rights to counsel. The pres-
ident of The Mead Corporation had been subpoenaed to appear
before an attorney of the Commission in connection with a non-
public "investigation being conducted to determine whether there
is reason to believe that Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended,
has been violated by The Mead Corporation. '7 The Mead Corpora-
tion moved for an order directing that its officers, who were sub-
3. 353 U.S. 322 (1957), reversing 237 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1956).
4. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
5. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
6. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 16241 (Frc Jan. 3, 1963).
7. Id. at 21061.
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poenaed in connection with the pending investigation, be given the
right of "full representation" by counsel of their choice. According
to the papers submitted in support of the motion, the Commis-
sion's attorney conducting the investigation informed The Mead
Corporation's counsel that he would be permitted only to accom-
pany the witness and to advise him privately, but would not be
allowed to speak on the record. This limitation was dictated by
Rule 1.40 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, which con-
fines counsel for persons subpoenaed in a closed-door hearing to
ear-whispering."
The Commission's ruling was made by a three to two vote. Ac-
cording to the majority, the seven new rules, giving witnesses' law-
yers a broader role in closed-door hearings, struck a reasonable
balance "between two legitimate interests, that of administrative
efficiency in conducting non-public pre-adjudicative investiga-
tions and that of proper representation by counsel of witnesses
compelled to testify in such investigations." 9 The new rules, the
majority believed, "will amply protect the legitimate interest of
subpoenaed witnesses without impeding or impairing the efficiency
of such investigations. We are convinced that these rules effectu-
ate the policy of Congress, and will not contribute to any 'regula-
tory lag' or delay investigational hearings.""
Relying on the first sentence of section 6(a) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act of 1946,1 which permits counsel for any-
one compelled to appear in an administrative investigation to ac-
company, represent and advise his client, the majority concluded
8. 27 Fed. Reg. 4610 (1962), amending 16 C.F.R. § 1.40 (1960).
The FTC's new rules relating to the rights of subpoenaed witnesses in in-
vestigative proceedings are codified in 28 Fed. Reg. 7082 (1963).
9. Mead Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) V 16241, at
21063 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963).
10. Id. at 21064. The first three of the seven new rules provide:
1. A witness may have present with him counsel of his own choice.
2. Counsel for a witness may advise his client, in confidence, and upon
the initiative of either himself or the witness, with respect to any
question asked of his client, and if the witness refuses to answer a
question, then counsel may briefly state on the record if he has
advised his client not to answer the question and the legal grounds
for such refusal.
3. Where it is claimed that the testimony or other evidence sought
from a witness is outside the scope of the investigation, or that the
witness is privileged (for reasons other than self-incrimination, as to
which immunity from prosecution or penalty is provided by Sec-
tion 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act) to refuse to answer a
question or to produce other evidence, counsel for the witness may
object on the record to the question or requirement and may state
briefly and precisely the grounds therefor.
11. 60 Stat. 240, 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).
1963]
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that "the legislative history and unqualified language of Section
6(a) indicate that Congress intended it to apply to all administra-
tive proceedings, including investigational hearings, where the ap-
pearance and testimony of witnesses is compelled."' 2
One dissenter believed, however, that the Commission should
await the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in an appeal and cross appeal from Federal Communications
Comm'n v. Schreiber." In that case District Judge Leon R.
Yankwich, pursuant to sections 409(f) and (g) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934,11 sustained the validity of a subpoena
duces tecum that required the defendants to appear before a Fed-
eral Communication Commission hearing examiner in an investiga-
tion into television programming practices. But subsequently, in his
conclusions of law, Judge Yankwich held section 6(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act applicable. The other dissenter in
Mead Corp. argued that since Rule 1.40 complies with section
6(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which is the only sec-
tion that specifically refers to nonpublic investigations, section
6(a) should not be applied to broaden the requirements of Rule
1.40. In support of this position, he relied on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Hannah v. Larche, quoting the portions that deny the
necessity of affording a witness full rights to counsel in a fact-
finding, non-adjudicatory investigation.
The new standards adopted in Mead Corp. broaden the rules of
permissible participation of counsel set forth in Groban and Han-
nah v. Larche. They also raise the broad question of the rights
of persons subpoenaed to appear before an official or investiga-
tive body, other than a grand jury or a legislative committee, 1
12. Mead Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) V 16241, at 21062(FTC Jan. 3, 1963); accord, 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.10, at 554-
55 (1958): "The first sentence reverses the law declared in Bowles v. Baer,
holding that witnesses subpoenaed in an administrative investigation may be
denied representation by counsel. If the person is 'compelled to appear
in person' he is entitled to counsel."
13. 201 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
14. 48 Stat. 1096, 47 U.S.C. §§ 409(0, (g) (1958).
15. Legislative committees investigate primarily for legislative purposes.
Moreover, a study of the rights of persons subpoenaed before such bodies
would lead us into the problem of the separation of powers, which is beyond
the scope of this Article. For Supreme Court cases involving subpoenaed
witnesses before congressional committees who based their refusals to
testify or to produce documents on other grounds than the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, see Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S.
456 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); United States
v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349 (1950); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Sinclair v. United
942
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in a private investigative hearing. The purpose of this Article is to
suggest certain due process requirements on the basis of a study
of the practices and procedures of various federal and state inves-
tigators and investigative bodies that have the benefit of subpoena
powers, trace the history of the grand jury, consider the mod-
em inquisitional trend, and discuss both the modem English and
French practices in the investigation of deviants.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Prior to the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, a
federal circuit court held in, Bowles v. Baer,"0 that a person
could be compelled to appear before an official investigator and
testify as well as produce documents without the benefit either of
counsel or of a court reporter retained by him. Even before this
decision, however, the Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure had recommended a bill that provided: "Every
person appearing or summoned in any administrative proceed-
ing shall be allowed the assistance of counsel. 117
In 1946 came section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act. As initially introduced, the first two sentences of section
6(a) of this act read:
Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or its
representative is entitled to counsel. In other cases, every party may
appear in person or by counsel .... 18
Congressman Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania stated in the House
Judiciary Committee's Report that this version of section 6(a)
is a statement of statutory and mandatory right of interested persons
to appear themselves or through or with counsel before any agency
in connection with any function, matter, or process whether formal,
informal, public, or private. The word "party" in the second sentence
is to be understood as meaning any person showing the requisite in-
terest in the matter, since the section applies in connection with
States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927);
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
16. 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944). In In re SEC, 14 F. Supp. 417
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir.), rev'd for mootness sub nom.
Bracken v. SEC, 299 U.S. 504 (1936), the court ordered a person to obey
a subpoena of the SEC "without giving him a copy of his testimony or af-
fording him the opportunity to bring his own stenographer." In re SEC,
supra at 418-19. See also Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 156 (1923);
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 470 (1912).
17. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1941).
18. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1946), reprinted in
Senate Comm.-on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative
History, S. Doc. NO. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 263 (1946).
1963]
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the exercise of any agency authority whether or not formal proceed-
ings are available.1 9
At the suggestion of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the prerog-
atives of the first sentence were explicity spelled out to accord to
any person compelled to appear before any agency the right to
be "accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel."2 Before
making this suggestion, the Committee explained "the first sen-
tence is a recognition that, in the administrative process, the benefit
of counsel shall be accorded as of right just as recognized by the
Bill of Rights in connection with the judicial process, and as pro-
posed by the Attorney General's Committee .. ". ."" The Com-
mittee was of the opinion that this change would facilitate the
efficient conduct of investigations by permitting counsel to be pres-
ent and to advise.
Thereafter the Administrative Procedure Act took its present
form. In the House Judiciary Committee Report the act was in-
terpreted as "an outline of minimum essential rights and proced-
ures."22 Congressman Waiter commented that "the representation
of counsel contemplated by the bill means full representation as
the term is understood in the courts of law."23 Finally, Senator
McCarran, the spokesman for the Administrative Procedure Act
in the Senate, stated that section 6(a) "provides that any person
compelled to appear in person before any agency or its representa-
tive is entitled to counsel. In other cases every party may appear
in person or by counsel." '24
Thus, by applying section 6(a) to a nonpublic investigative
hearing, the majority in Mead Corp. acted consistently with the
above statements of congressional intent. Furthermore, the inter-
pretation of section 6(a) by the Attorney General and the Hoov-
er Commission support the FTC's holding. The Attorney Gen-
eral's Manual on the Administrative Act takes the view that sec-
tion 6(a)
19. H.R. REP. No. 1980, supra note 18, at 31-32; S. Doc. No. 248,
supra note 18, at 263-64. Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada in the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Report made substantially the same comment.
S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1945), reprinted in S. Doc. No.
248, supra note 18, at 205.
20. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 18, at 26.
21. Ibid.
22. H. REP. No. 1980, supra note 18, at 16, reprinted in S. Doc. No.
248, supra note 18, at 250.
23. 92 CONG. REc. 5652 (1946), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 248, supra
note 18, at 362-63. This will vary, of course, depending on whether a per-
son is a defendant in a criminal case, a party in civil litigation, or a witness
in either.
24. 92 CONG. REC. 2156 (1946), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 248, supra note
18, at 256.
1 INQUISITIONS BY OFFICIALS
. restates existing law 'and practice that persons compelled to appear
in person before an agency or its representative must be accorded the
right to be accompanied by counsel and to consult with or be advised
by such counsel.25
The Hoover Commission some years later reported that
In enacting section 6(a) . . . Congress intended that any person com-
pelled to appear, or appearing voluntarily, before any agency or its
officers and employees should be entitled to the benefit of counsel or
other qualified representative. 26
Nevertheless, administrative agencies have generally been slow to
change their existing practices to conform to the requirements of
section 6(a). For instance, the Internal Revenue Service in a
1945 Manual of Instructions for Special Agents, Intelligence Unit, 7
limited the participation of counsel of a subpoenaed person to ad-
vising him of his right to refuse to give answers that might in-
criminate him. According to the Manual, a third-party witness could
be advised by his own counsel, but not by counsel for the tax-
payer. Despite the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act,
the Internal Revenue Service continued its old practice, and in two
reported cases, district courts sanctioned its refusal to permit a
witness to be represented by counsel of his own choice because
that counsel also represented the taxpayer who was under inves-
tigation.m In Backer v. Commissioner,-' however, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a subpoenaed witness was
entitled to counsel of his own choice even though that counsel also
25. Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Act 61-62 (1947),
quoted by the majority in Mead Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade
Cas.) 16241, at 21062 n.2 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963).
26. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 287-88
(1955), quoted in part by the majority in Mead Corp., TRADE REG. REP.
(1963 Trade Cas.) 16241, at 21062 n.2 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963). The Hoover
Commission is incorrect in stating that section 6(a) applies to a person ap-
pearing voluntarily, but this does not detract from the force of its observa-
tions.
27. As quoted in Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir.
1960).
28. Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952); United
States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1949). In Torras v. Stradley,
supra, the court further held that the subpoenaed witness was not entitled
to have his own stenographer present to take notes of his testimony. The
Hoover Commission listed these two cases in its REPORT ON LEGAL SERV-
ICES AND PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 26, at 287.
29. 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960). In United States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp.
293, 294 (D. Conn. 1949), the court held § 6(a) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act applicable to nonpublic investigative hearings of the Internal
Revenue Service: "We hold, therefore, that witnesses summoned to appear
before Special Agents have the right to the presence and advice of counsel."
19631
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represented the taxpayer being investigated. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission, to consider another example, currently has
double restrictions on the right to counsel that are comparable to
those of the Internal Revenue Service. Under the SEC's Rule
3(c),3 counsel for a subpoenaed witness may represent another
witness or party only if the investigating officer or the Commission
finds no conflict of interests or threat of disrupting the investiga-
tion.3 Professor Loss states that counsel in an SEC investigation
is limited to advising his client of his constitutional and common-
law privileges and to objecting to questions that exceed the
scope of the investigation."
It appears that many agencies have disregarded section 6(a)
of the Administrative Procedure Act and the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments in limiting the rights of
subpoenaed persons before investigative officials.
II. FEDERAL ONE-MAN INVESTIGATORS
1. Agriculture Department.
The Departments of Agriculture and Labor and the SEC each
has six separate statutory provisions under which one-man inves-
tigators function with subpoena powers. In the order of their en-
actment, the provisions applicable to the Department of Agricul-
ture are: Packers and Stockyards Act,3 The Grain Futures Act
(Commodity Exchange Act),' Perishable Agricultural Commod-
ities Act,35 Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act,3 6 Tobacco In-
spection Act,3" and Federal Seed Act.38
30.
It is clear that the right to counsel guaranteed under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act is much broader than the right to have an attor-
ney to advise him relative to his rights under the Fifth Amendment.
The Act says such counsel may accompany, represent and advise the
witness, without any limitation . . . . The term "right to counsel"
has always been construed to mean counsel of one's own choice.
. . . When Congress used the terms "right to be accompanied, repre-
sented, and advised by counsel," it must have used the language in the
regularly accepted connotation ....
Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1960).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 201.3(3) (Supp. 1962).
32. 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1954-55 (2d ed. 1961).
33. 42 Stat. 168 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 222 (1958).
34. 42 Stat. 1002 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). An Act
of June 15, 1936, changed the short title from "The Grain Futures Act"
to "Commodity Exchange Act." 49 Stat. 1491, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
35. 46 Stat. 536 (1930), 7 U.S.C. § 499(m) (1958).
36. 48 Stat. 37 (1933), 7 U.S.C. § 610(h) (1958).
37. 49 Stat. 735 (1935), 7 U.S.C. § 511 (n) (1958).
38. 53 Stat. 1289 (1939), 7 U.S.C. § 1603 (1958). The Packers and
946
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Although each of the first four of these acts has an immunity
provision similar to the one set forth in the Compulsory Testi-
mony Act of 1893,11 the remaining two acts have no immunity
provisions. The 1893 act amended the Interstate Commerce
Act's narrow immunity provisions,"° which had been invalidated
in Counselman v. Hitchcock.41 This amendment was sustained
three years later in Brown v. Walker,42 which was the first Su-
preme Court decision to sustain a compulsory testimony provi-
sion. The act required a person subpoenaed under the Interstate
Commerce Act to testify, but protected him from being "prosecut-
ed or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may tes-
tify . . . .14
The Securities Act of 1933 refined the 1893-type provisions by
requiring a subpoenaed person to claim his privilege against self-
incrimination before being granted immunity; nearly all subse-
quently enacted immunity provisions are of this type. The drafters
of the Securities Act of 1933 proved to be farsighted on behalf of
the government, for in United States v. Monia"l the Supreme
Court held that under the older form of immunity provision, a
witness was immune even though he had not asserted his privilege
against self-incrimination or his right of silence.
The Commodity Exchange Act and the Packers and Stockyards
Act both empower the Secretary of Agriculture to investigate "in
order to provide information for the use of Congress. '" 6 The
Commodity Exchange Act empowers him to "make such investiga-
tions as he may deem necessary to ascertain the facts regarding
the operations of boards of trade""7 and, in addition, to "inves-
Stockyards Act and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act refer to
the enforcement procedures of the Federal Trade Commission Act, while
the Grain Futures Act refers to the enforcement procedures of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. The Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act contains
enforcement procedures similar to those referred to above.
39. 27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
40. 24 Stat. 382, 383 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
41. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
42. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). In several recent cases the Court reaffirmed
its holding in Brown v. Walker. See, e.g., Piemonte v. United States, 367
U.S. 556 (1961) (immunity provision in the Narcotic Control Act of 1956);
Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960) (same); Brown v. United
States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) (Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893); Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (Immunity Act of 1954).
43. 27 Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
44. 48 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(c) (1958).
45. 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
46. Commodity Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 1003 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 12
(1958); Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 168, 7 U.S.C. § 222 (1958).
47. 42 Stat. 1003 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
1963]
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tigate marketing conditions of commodity and commodity products
and byproducts, including supply and demand for these commodi-
ties, cost to the consumer, and handling and transportation
charges."4 The remaining acts provide for various investigations
as well as inspections of records and products.49 The Federal Seed
Act also requires the Secretary to give the accused appropriate
notice and an opportunity to present "his views, either orally or
in writing"5 before he reports any violation of the act to the
appropriate United States attorney. In the event of cease and de-
sist proceedings under the act, the Secretary shall proceed by way
of written complaint, notice, and a hearing at which "there shall
be afforded the person a reasonable opportunity to be informed as
to the evidence introduced against him (including the right of
cross-examination), and to be heard in person or by counsel and
through witnesses.""
Although there are provisions for counsel in formal proceed-
ings,52 the Secretary's many rules and regulations do not provide
for counsel in investigations.5" In proceedings under the Perish-
able Agricultural Commodities Act 4 and the Agricultural Mar-
keting Agreement Act,55 the presiding officer has a great amount
of disciplinary control over counsel, and under the latter act, the
presiding officer may exclude counsel from the proceedings if he
is guilty of unethical or unprofessional conduct.
In an early case, the Secretary, acting under the Packers and
48. Ibid.
49. Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, 46 Stat. 536, 7 U.
S.C. § 499m (1958); Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 48 Stat. 34(1933), 7 U.S.C. § 608 (1958); Tobacco Inspection Act, 49 Stat. 732(1935), 7 U.S.C. § 511b (1958); Federal Seed Act, 53 Stat. 1281 (1939),
7 U.S.C. § 1572 (1958).
50. 53 Stat. 1286 (1939), 7 U.S.C. § 1598 (1958).
51. 53 Stat. 1287 (1939), 7 U.S.C. § 1599(a) (1958).
52. 7 C.F.R. § 1.26(a)(1) (1959) (departmental proceedings), § 47.32(c)(1)(1959) (proceedings under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.(1930), § 201.154(c)(1) (1959) (proceedings under the Federal Seed Act),§ 900.60(b)(1) (1963) (proceedings under the Agriculture Marketing Agree-
ment Act); 9 C.F.R. § 202.11(c)(1) (1959) (proceedings under the Packers
and Stockyards Act, 1921). In departmental proceedings the rules provide:
"In any proceedings before the Department, the parties may appear in per-
son or by counsel or other representative. Persons who appear as counsel
or in a representative capacity at a hearing must conform to the standards
of ethical conduct required of practitioners before the courts of the United
States." 7 C.F.R. § 1.26(a)(1) (1959).
53. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 47.3 (1959) (proceedings under the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930), § 201.151 (1959) (proceedings
under the Federal Seed Act); 9 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1959) (Packers and Stock-
yards Act, 1921).
54. 7 C.F.R. § 47.32(c)(2) (1959).
55. 7 C.F.R. § 900.60(b)(2) (1963).
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Stockyards Act, demanded access to the account books and rec-
ords of certain packing companies before any complaint had been
filed; the court held that this was unreasonable and violated the
fourth amendment. 6 But two later cases had little difficulty in en-
forcing investigative subpoenas duces tecum under the same act. 7
In one of these, the court stated that if the agency, acting within
its authority, made a definite demand for relevant information,
the investigation could be made before a complaint was filed with-
out violating the act.58
2. Atomic Energy Commission.
The Atomic Energy Commission is authorized to make such
studies and investigations as it may deem necessary or proper
to assist it in exercising any of its statutory functions. 9 The im-
munity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 are
applicable only to an individual who specifically asserts his privilege
against self-incrimination. This is the refined type of compul-
sory testimony provisions that began with the Securities Act of
1933.
The AEC's regulations provide that hearings will be either for-
mal or informal." In formal hearings a party may be represented
by counsel,61 but there is no provision for counsel in informal
hearings-the investigator follows procedures that best serve the
purpose of the hearing, yet that are consistent with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.62
3. Civil Aeronautics Board.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has a rather complete statutory
procedural blueprint.' Its one-man investigators are Board mem-
56. Cudahy Packing Co. v. United States, 15 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1926).
57. United States v. Woerth, 130 F. Supp. 930 (N.D. Iowa 1955),
afjd, 231 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. C. & V. Poultry,
Inc., 132 F. Supp. 945 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
58. United States v. Woerth, 130 F. Supp. 940, 941 (N.D. Iowa 1955).
59. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 948, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(c)(1958).
60. Cf. 10 C.F.R. § 2.756 (1963).
61. 10 C.F.R. § 2.713 (1963).
62. 10 C.F.R. § 2.756 (1963).
63.
(a) Any.member or examiner of the Board, when duly designated
by the Board for such purpose, may hold hearings, sign and issue sub-
penas, administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence at any
.place in the United States designated by the Board. In all cases
heard by an examiner or a .single member the Board shall hear or re-
ceive argument on request of either party.(b) For the purposes of this Act the Board shall have the power to
9491963]
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bers or designated examiners who may conduct hearings anywhere
in the United States. Its subpoenas, which may run anywhere in
the United States, are enforced by federal court orders, and fail-
ure to obey such an order constitutes contempt of the court issuing
it. Witness fees and mileage are the same as those paid federal
court witnesses. When the Board's examiner inquires into devi-
ant behavior, the Board has the benefit of the calculated form of
the Compulsory Testimony Act that began with the Securities Act
of 1933 and under which a subpoenaed person must claim his
privilege against self-incrimination to obtain immunity.
The CAB, in its Rules of Practice in Aircraft Accident Investiga-
tion Hearings, has double restrictions on the right to counsel
require by subpena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of all books, papers, and documents relating to any
matter under investigation. Witnesses summoned before the Board
shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the
courts of the United States.(c) The attendance of witnesses, and the production of books, pa-
pers, and documents, may be required from any place in the United
States, at any designated place of hearing. In case of disobedience to
a subpena, the Board, or any party to a proceeding before the Board,
may invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring at-
tendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of such books,
papers, and documents under the provisions of this section.(d) Any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which
an inquiry is carried on may, in case of contumacy or refusal to
obey a subpoena issued to any person, issue an order requiring
such person to appear before the Board (and produce books, papers,
or documents if so ordered) and give evidence touching the matter
in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be
punished by such court as a contempt thereof.
(i) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying, or
from producing books, papers or documents before the Board, or in
obedience to the subpoena of the Board, or in any cause orproceeding, criminal or otherwise, based upon or growing out of any
alleged violation of this Act, or of any rule, regulation, requirement,
or order thereunder, or any term, condition, or limitation of any
certificate or permit, on the ground, or for the reason, that the testi-
mony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but
no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or for-feiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing con-
cerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary
or otherwise, except that any individual so testifying shall not be exemptfrom prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testi-
fying.
72 Stat. 792 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1484(a)-(d), (i) (1958). With reference
to the provision in § 1484(a) that "the Board shall hear or receive argu-
ment on request of either party," the court held in Sisto v. CAB, 179F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1949) that "this does not bind them to do it in any
particular manner." Id. at 54.
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comparable to those of the Internal Revenue Service and the SEC.
One of these rules, although inferentially admitting the applicabil-
ity of section 6(a), nevertheless denies the right to make objec-
tions during the hearing." Another rule empowers the hearing
officer to designate parties to the investigation 5 and threatens
a party with loss of status if he is represented by any person
who also represents a claimant or insurer."
CAB v. Hermann,7 discussed above, illustrates how far the
Supreme Court will now go in the enforcement of administrative
subpoenas. The subpoenaed persons resisted the subpoenas on
grounds of burdensomeness (compliance would have required
search through more than a million documents), irrelevancy,
and immunity of personal income tax returns. The appellate court
reversed the district court's enforcement order, reasoning that to
give rubber-stamp approval to the Board's subpoenas would create
in that body the authority to judge the relevancy and materiality of
each document subpoenaed.6" The Supreme Court's per curiam
reversal indicates its apparent approval of the rubber-stamp meth-
od and disregard for the constitutional questions involved.
4. Civilian Production Administration.
During World War IT the War Production Board, the Depart-
meit of the Army, the Navy Department, the Treasury Depart-
ment, the United States Maritime Commission, and the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation all had subpoena powers in the in-
spection of plants and the audit of books of defense contractors.6 9
Immunity rights were similar to those contained in the Securities
Act of 4933.70 Moreover, the enforcement procedures for these
subpoenas were of the drastic type available to the Internal Reve-
nue Service and the Federal Trade Commission. These units of
government could apply for a court order to enforce their sub-
poenas;71 failure to comply with these subpoenas, even without a
court order, was a misdemeanor that subjected the subpoenaed
person "to a fine of not more than $5,000, or to imprisonment
for a term of not more than one year, or both."
64. 14 C.F.R. § 303.2 (1963).
65. 14 C.F.R. § 303.16(a) (1963).
66. 14 C.F.R. § 303.16(b) (1963).
67. 353 U.S. 322 (1957), reversing per curiam 237 F.2d 359 (9th Cir.
1956); see Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces
Tecum: Another Look at CAB v. Hermann, 69 YALE LJ. 131 (1959).
68. Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359, 363 (1956).
69. Exec. Order No. 9127, 7 Fed. Reg. 2753 (1942).
70. Second War Powers Act of 1942, ch. 199, § 1302, 56 Stat. 185.
71. Second War Powers Act of 1942, ch. 199, § 1303, 56 Stat. 186.
72. Ibid.
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In 1945 the War Production Board was terminated, and its
functions were transferred to the Civilian Production Administra-
tion. 3 The next year this agency was consolidated, with other
agencies, into the Office of Temporary Controls. 4 A year later
the Office of Temporary Controls was terminated, and the functions
of the Civilian Production Administration were transferred for
liquidation to the Department of Commerce."
5. Coast Guard.
One of the earliest grants of subpoena power to an administra-
tive official was an 1871 act relating to the officers and crews of
vessels." Local boards of inspectors were authorized to subpoena
witnesses to appear in investigations of acts of incompetency or
misconduct committed by a licensed officer while acting under
the authority of his license-these subpoenas were enforced by
federal court orders.
Today the Coast Guard is authorized to investigate marine
casualties and accidents as well as all acts of misconduct or in-
competency of any licensed officer or any holder of any certificate
of service.77 The authorizing statute grants to the party being in-
vestigated the right to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine
witnesses, to state his defense, to appeal to the Commandant of
the Coast Guard, and to be represented by counsel on that ap-
peal.7" There is, however, no immunity (compulsory testimony)
provision.
Despite the statutory provisions for counsel, the regulations of
the Commandant of the Coast Guard distinguish between investi-
gations and hearings, making no provision for counsel in the form-
73. Exec. Order No. 9638, 10 Fed. Reg. 12591 (1945).
74. Exec. Order No. 9809, 11 Fed. Reg. 14281 (1946).
75. Exec. Order No. 9841, 12 Fed. Reg. 2645 (1947). In Cook v. United
States, 69 F. Supp. 445 (D. Ore. 1946), a subordinate agency employee of
the Civilian Production Administration subpoenaed a building contractor to
disclose the names of his customers and the nature of his contracts. The
contractor asked the court to quash the subpoena. The judge did so, on
the ground that the subpoena was indefinite as to time, and continued:
I might add: I do not understand that a minor government official
can summon people at will to give testimony about their affairs and
the affairs of their customers and neighbors. A United States Attor-
ney cannot do that.
Ibid.
76. REV. STAT. § 4450 (1875), amended by 49 Stat. 1381 (1936), as
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 239 (1958).
77. 49 Stat. 1381 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 239(b) (1958).
78. Ibid.
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er.79 A party subject to investigation is only to be advised of the
substance of the complaint and given an opportunity to refute it.'
Like the early boards of inspectors, the Coast Guard is author-
ized to enforce its subpoenas by a process similar to that granted
to the United States District Courts."' One case assumed that this
meant that the Coast Guard would apply to the court in the first
instance to compel obedience.'
6. Commerce Department.
The Export Control Act of 1949,1 administered by the Sec-
retary of Commerce, 4 limits the application of the immunity
provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 to cases
where the party specifically claims his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. 5 Moreover, with the exception of section 3, which re-
lates to the publication of information, the act specifically ex-
cludes the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act."
The Secretary set up compliance procedures to be administered
by compliance commissioners. An individual charged with non-
compliance "may, if he so desires, be represented by counsel of
his own choosing."'  Compliance procedures are to be confiden-
tial except as to any resulting orders, but copies of transcripts of
testimony are to be available to "parties to the proceedings and,
to the extent of their own testimony as contained in transcripts, to
witnesses."'s A compliance commissioner may consider classified
materials, but "in no case shall the respondent or his attorney be
entitled to inspect the classified materials."8 9
79. 46 C.F.R. §§ 131.09-.20 (1952).
80. 46 C.F.R. § 137.05-5(b) (1952).
81. 49 Stat. 1382 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 239(e) (1958).
82. In re Merchant Mariners Documents, 91 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal.
1949). There an examiner sought a court order requiring seamen to deliver
to him their certificates of service pending final disposition of disciplinary
charges against them. The court denied relief, but stated by way of dictum
that
if the certificates were sought for use as evidence, the issuance of sub-
poenas requiring that they be presented would be within the authority
of the Examiner and within the jurisdiction of this court to compel
obedience.
Id. at 428
83. 63 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2021-32 (1958) (Supp.
1962).
84. Exec. Order No. 10945, 26 Fed. Reg. 4487 (1961).
85. 63 Stat. 8, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2026(b) (1958) (Supp.
1958).
86. 63 Stat. 9, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2027 (1958) (Supp.
1958).
87. 15 C.F.R. § 382.3(a) (1963).
88. 15 C.F.R. § 382.14 (1963).
89. 15 C.F.R. § 382.7(c) (1963).
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7. Commodity Exchange Commission.
The Commodity Exchange Act established the Commodity Ex-
change Commission, consisting of the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General. The Commis-
sion may suspend for a period not to exceed six months or revoke
the designation of any board of trade as a "contract market.""0
Witnesses are subject to the enforcement procedures and immun-
ity provision of the Interstate Commerce Act." The applicable
rules assign initial proceedings to a referee and, as to representation,
have a provision like that of the Agriculture Department for de-
partmental proceedings.92
8. Federal Aviation Agency.
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency is empow-
ered to "conduct such investigations . .. as he shall deem neces-
sary" to fulfill his responsibilities.93 His statutory enforcement pro-
cedures are the same as those of the CAB. 4 His regulations do
not provide for counsel in investigations.9"
9. Federal Communications Commission.
The Federal Communications Commission is authorized, with
or without complaint, to investigate matters within its jurisdiction
"in such manner and by such means as it shall deem proper."9 0
On one occasion it was authorized to conduct a special investiga-
tion of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and all
other companies engaged in telephone communication in inter-
state commerce. 7
The FCC's subpoenas are enforced by court orders, 8 and its
compulsory testimony provision99 is like that in the Securities Act
of 1933. A person subpoenaed to appear in an FCC investigative
proceeding has no right to counsel, and the rules permit the Com-
mission to proceed in a manner that "will best serve the purposes
of such proceeding."'0 0
Since the FCC is of comparatively recent origin, it has had little
90. 42 Stat. 1001 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
91. 42 Stat. 1002 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 0.61(c)(1) (1949).
93. 72 Stat. 752 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1354(a) (1958).
94. 72 Stat. 753 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1354 (c) (1958).
95. 14 C.F.R. § 408.12 (1962).
96. 48 Stat. 1073, 1094 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 208, 403 (1958).
97. S.J. Res. 46, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 Stat. 43 (1935).
98. 48 Stat. 1096 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 409(f), (g) (1958).
99. 48 Stat. 1097 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 409(i) (1958).
100. 47 C.F.R. § 1.10 (1958).
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difficulty in enforcing its subpoenas. The stress has been on ques-
tions relating to the rights of subpoenaed persons. In FCC v.
Cohn,' a case arising out of investigations into television broad-
casting, the court indicated that the FCC's subpoena powers ex-
tend to any individual who may possess documents relevant to the
investigation even though that individual is not subject to the
Commission's regulatory power.0 2 In an earlier case, Stahlman
v. FCC,03 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed an order of enforcement of one of the Commis-
sion's subpoenas that required a prominent newspaper publisher,
associated with an FM radio station, to appear at an investiga-
tion into high frequency broadcast stations. The court reasoned
that the Commission had authority to obtain information relevant
to an investigation "aimed at the prevention or disclosure of prac-
tices contrary to public interest."'0'
10. Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
This "Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as
it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation,
examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be
known as 'Federal Savings and Loan Associations.' "I" The au-
thorizing section contemplates only an adjudicative hearing con-
ducted by a hearing examiner."" The Board or any of its mem-
bers or representatives may issue subpoenas that are enforced by
court orders. Most of the hearings are private, and although there
is no immunity provision, a party may be represented by counsel.",
101. 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also FCC v. Schreiber, 201
F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
102. FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 906 (1957).
103. 126 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1942), affirming 40 F. Supp. 338 (D.C.
1941).
104. Id. at 127-28. The amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act to
which the court refers gave the ICC authority on its own motion to inves-
tigate any matter "concerning which any question may arise under any of
the provisions of this act." 36 Stat. 551 (1910), 49 U.S.C. § 13(2) (1958).
This amendment was passed to overcome the restrictive interpretation of
Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908), and it succeeded. Smith v. ICC,
245 U.S. 33 (1917).
105. 48 Stat. 132 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1958).
106. 48 Stat. 132 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1) (1958)
107. 12 C.F.R. § 509.4 (1963). In a recent case, Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd. v. Long Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 295 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.
1961), the court held that the hearing examiner was not validly appointed
because he was not selected by the Civil Service Commission, but rather
was borrowed from the SEC although with approval of the Civil Service
Commission.
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11. Federal Maritime Commission.
The Federal Maritime Commission' has investigative and sub-
poena powers under the Shipping Act of 1916..9 and the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1936.110 The latter act gives subpoena pow-
ers to the members of the Commission as well as to the Secretary
of Commerce for the purpose of any investigation that, in the opin-
ion of the Commission or the Secretary, is necessary and proper
in carrying out the provisions of the act. The immunity provision
of the 1916 act"' is similar to the one set forth in the Compulsory
Testimony Act of 1893, while the 1936 act" 2 contains the re-
fined type of immunity clause first enacted by the Securities Act
of 1933.
The Commission's rules distinguish between investigative hear-
ings and adjudicative proceedings."' In investigative hearings
counsel are limited to ear-whispering although a witness is entitled
either to receive a copy of his testimony (upon paying for it) or
to inspect it."4
In a case involving an investigation of general increases of
Alaskan rates and charges,"' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed an enforcement order of a subpoena duces tecum
although neither the Commission nor the district court had made
a finding of relevance. But in two other cases"0 involving alien
108. The Shipping Act of 1916 established the United States Shipping
Board. Ch. 451, § 3, 39 Stat. 729. It was abolished in 1933, and its func-
tions were transferred to the Department of Commerce. Exec. Order
No. 6166, § 12, set out in a note to 5 U.S.C. § 132 (1958). The Merchant
Marine Act, 1936, created the United States Maritime Commission, and vest-
ed in it the functions of the former United States Shipping Board. 49 Stat.
1985, 1987 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114 (1958). Reorganization Plan
No. 21 of 1950 created the Federal Maritime Board, and transferred to it
the investigative functions of the United States Maritime Commission. 64
Stat. 1273 (1950). Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961 abolished the Fed-
eral Maritime Board and transferred its functions to the Federal Maritime
Commission. 75 Stat. 840 (1961).
109. 39 Stat. 737, 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1958).
110. 49 Stat. 1991, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1124(a), (b) (1958); Reorganization
Plan No. 7 of 1961, 75 Stat. 840 (1961).
111. 39 Stat. 737 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 827 (1958). In two related cases
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, following
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943), that subpoenaed grand jury
witnesses obtained immunity under this section without specific claims of
their privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Niarchos, 125
F. Supp. 214 (D.D.C. 1954); United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190
(D.D.C. 1954).
112. 49 Stat. 1991 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1124(c) (1958).
113. 46 C.F.R. § 201.295 (1962).
114. 46 C.F.R. § 201.300 (1962).
115. Lee v. Federal Maritime Bd., 284 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 1960).
116. Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147 (D.
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corporations engaged in the common carriage of cargo and pas-
sengers, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit vacated orders of the Commission for the production of in-
formation because the orders failed to state the purpose for which
the information was demanded and, thus, "precluded a determi-
nation of relevancy. "117
12. Federal Petroleum Board.
The Federal Petroleum Board administers the Connally Hot Oil
Act,11 and for this purpose, it has the same investigative powers
as the SEC.' 9 Although the Board in its earlier years and its
predecessors, the Federal Tender Boards, made their investigative
subpoenas returnable before them as bodies," ° a 1962 amend-
ment of the applicable regulations clearly indicates that the Board's
chairman or any Interior Department employee whom he designates
may exercise the Board's investigative powers. 12 In ordering the
amendment, Secretary of the Interior Udall stated that the amend-
ment was intended "to include in the regulations on the Conally
Act a clear statement of the authority to conduct investigations
under that act."1 22 In several enforcement cases the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit analogized the investigative powers of
these boards to those of a grand jury."m
13. Federal Power Commission.
The Federal Power Commission has investigative and subpoena
powers under the Federal Power Act 24 and the Natural Gas
C. Cir. 1961). Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 138
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
117. Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 155
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
118. 49 Stat. 30 (1935), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-7151 (1958).
The President delegated his relevant powers under the act to the Secretary
of the Interior, who in turn designated the Federal Petroleum Board to ad-
minister his regulations under his supervision. Exec. Order No. 10752, 23
Fed. Reg. 973 (1958); 30 C.F.R. § 222.2 (1959).
119. 49 Stat. 33 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 715h (1958).
120. See, e.g., Kilgore Nat'l Bank v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 209 F.2d
557 (5th Cir. 1954); Zinser v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 148 F.2d 993 (5th
Cir. 1945); Genecov v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 146 F.2d 596 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 865 (1945); Graham v. Federal Tender Ed.,
118 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1941).
121. 30 C.F.R. § 222.25 (1963).
122. 27 Fed. Reg. 11760 (1962).
123. Kilgore Nat'l Bank v. Federal Petroleum Rd., 209 F.2d 557, 560
(5th Cir. 1954); Genecov v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 146 F.2d 596 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 865 (1945); The President v. Skeen, 118
F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1941).
124. 49 Stat. 856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825f (1958).
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Act,'25 both of which contain compulsory testimony provisions
of the same type as in the Securities Act of 1933. The FPC's sub-
poenas are enforced by court orders,'26 and the willful failure to
obey a subpoena constitutes a misdemeanor with a correspond-
ing fine of not more than 1,000 dollars or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both."z In FPC v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 2' the Supreme Court stated that respondent's good faith
refusal to obey an FPC subpoena did not constitute a "willful"
violation of the Federal Power Act because the FPC had not ap-
plied to a federal court for enforcement.
The FPC goes beyond the requirements of section 6(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act and makes provision for full repre-
sentation by counsel for voluntary as well as subpoenaed wit-
nesses.
(2) Any person compelled to appear or voluntarily testifying or
making a statement before the Commission or the presiding officer,
may be accompanied, represented and advised by an attorney or
other qualified representative.
(3) All persons appearing before the Commission or the presiding of-
ficer must conform to the standards of ethical conduct required of
practitioners before the Courts of the United States . . . .129
14. Federal Trade Commission.
As a result of recent expressions of opposition to the limited
role of counsel in nonpublic investigative hearings, the Federal
Trade Commission adopted the rules set forth in Mead Corp.3 '
In Wanderer v. Kaplan"'. a federal district court held that section
6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act applied to investiga-
tive as well as adjudicative proceedings before the FTC. In another
case, the FTC, departing from its usual practice of conducting in-
125. 52 Stat. 828 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717m (1958).
126. For such a case under the Natural Gas Act, see People Natural
Gas Co. v. FPC, 127 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 700
(1942).
127. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825f(c)
(1958); Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 828 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717m(d) (1958).
128. 304 U.S. 375 (1938). Chief Justice Hughes characterized the FPC's
order in that case as "nothing more than a notice," and commented that
the Commission had no authority "to enforce its directions to appear, tes-
tify or produce books and papers save by application to a federal court.
. . ." Id. at 386. For a similar dictum, see Mississippi Power & Light Co.
v. FPC, 131 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1942).
129. 18 C.F.R. § 1.4(a) (1961).
130. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 16241 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963,
discussed in text accompanying notes 6-15 supra. See 28 Fed. Reg. 7082
(1963).




vestigative hearings in private, ordered a public investigation of
milk pricing in Indiana and subpoenaed officials of the Kroger
Company as well as other food chains. 32 The Kroger Company
then obtained a temporary restraining order and the FTC with-
drew the subpoenas directed to the Kroger officials. In yet other
cases there were complaints that the FTC's rule limiting counsel
to ear-whispering was unfair."3
The FTC is one of the agencies, along with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission that has been in existence long enough to have
witnessed a reversal in the Supreme Court's attitude toward its
investigational subpoenas and orders. In FTC v. American To-
132. Hall v. Lemke, TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 70338 (N.D.
lU. May 7, 1962).
133. Warehouse Distribs., Inc., BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No.
48, at A-9, June 12, 1962 (nonpublic investigation in which counsel was
not permitted to object to questions or answers, to make statements on the
record, or to examine his client); St. Regis Paper Co., BNA Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. No. 25, at A-9, Jan. 2, 1962 (counsel limited to advising
client).
The Administrative Conference of the United States has adopted an in-
terpretation of § 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act that appears
to be consistent with the standards set forth in Mead Corp., TRADE REG.
REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 16241 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963).
a. The right to be "accompanied" by counsel means the right of any
person compelled to appear before any agency or agency representative
to have counsel present with him during any proceeding or investiga-
tion.
b. The right to be "advised" by counsel means that any person com-
pelled to appear in person shall be entitled to the advice in confidence
of counsel before, during, and after the conclusion of any agency pro-
ceeding or investigation for which his presence is compelled.
c. The right to be "represented" by counsel means as a minimum that
counsel for any person compelled to appear in person shall be per-
mitted to make objections on the record and to argue briefly the basis
for such objections in connection with any agency examination of his
client.
d. In addition, each agency is urged to re-examine its rules and prac-
tice and to effect appropriate changes therein to the extent that it de-
termines that it can properly permit persons compelled to appear in
person in any agency proceeding or investigation to be examined fur-
ther for the record by their own counsel following other questioning.
It Is Recommended that:
2. The right to counsel be interpreted with a view to preserving the
highest concept of administrative fairness and as generously as rea-
sonable administrative efficiency permits. Agencies should recognize
that the right to counsel, including, to the extent appropriate, oppor-
tunity for cross-examination and production of limited rebuttal testi-
mony or documentary evidence, is particularly important to any per-
son involved in a public investigation where implications of wrong-
doing by that person are made a part of the public record.
ADMINIsTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
FOURTH PLENARY SESSION 4-5 (June 29, 1962).
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bacco Co.'34 the Court refused to support FTC orders for the pro-
duction of documents because it thought the requests involved
"fishing expeditions."' 35 But in United States v. Morton Salt Co."
the Court sustained an order of the FTC even though it involved
"a mere 'fishing expedition.' ,137 The order required the re-
spondent corporations to file reports showing how they had com-
plied with a court decree enforcing one of the FTC's cease and
desist orders. After comparing administrative investigations to
grand jury proceedings, the Court stated that the order would be
upheld even if based upon nothing more than "official curiosity."
38
Since Morton Salt, the courts have enforced a variety of the Com-
mission's subpoenas and orders under varying circumstances. In
FTC v. Crafts139 the Court, in a per curiam reversal, required
the enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum for a quantity of
records of an insurance company; the FTC was investigating the
company's advertising practices. In FTC v. Harrell4' the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that section 9 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act 4' authorizes the FTC to subpoena
the records of individuals as well as those of corporations. In
two more cases the courts enforced subpoenas duces tecum calling
for documentary evidence from persons neither being investigated
nor proceeded against 4 -- there have been many comparable rul-
ings.143
134. 264 U.S. 298 (1924), discussed in text accompanying notes 1-3
supra.
135. Id. at 306.
136. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
137. Id. at 641.
138. Id. at 652.
139. 355 U.S. 9 (1957), reversing 244 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1957); see
St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961), affirming 285
F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), affirming in part and reversing in part 181 F. Supp.
862 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Contra, FTC v. Dilger, 276 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960).
140. 313 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1963), reversing 205 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Ill.
1962).
141. 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958). This section provides
that the FTC "shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose
of examination, and the right to copy any documentary evidence of any
corporation being investigated or proceeded against; and the commission
shall have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to
any matter under investigation."
142. FTC v. Bowman, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1957); FTC v. Tuttle.
244 F.2d 605 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957).
143. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Am., Inc., 306 F.2d 231 (3d Cir.
1962); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 864 (1962). ("As pointed out in Federal Communications Commission
v. Cohn .. . broadness alone is not sufficient justification to refuse en-
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The FTC's enforcement procedures are as severe as those of the
FPC and the Internal Revenue Service. Although under section 9
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC may apply to the
federal courts for enforcement orders of its subpoenas,"' which
is the usual procedure for the enforcement of the subpoenas of
administrative agencies, section 10 contains additional, and more
stringent, remedies. 1 5 A person who fails to obey one of the
Commission's subpoenas "shall be guilty of an offense and upon
conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be
punished by a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000,
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.""14 A person who denies the Commis-
sion access to records requested for the purpose of inspection is
subject to the same fines, but may be imprisoned for up to three
years.'47 If a corporation fails to file a requested report within the
time specified, "and such failure shall continue for thirty days after
notice of such default, the corporation shall forfeit to the United
States the sum of $100 for each and every day of the continuance
of such failure."' 4
Moreover, in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States,"'8 the Court
not only sustained the validity of a Commission order for the pro-
duction of copies of schedules submitted to the Census Bureau,
but also held the corporate defendant liable for the fine of 100
dollars a day even before the time of any court enforcement or-
der and despite the fact that the district court had found the Com-
mission's orders "partially defective."' Apparently, the language
in FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 5' excusing good faith dis-
forcement of a subpoena so long as the material sought is relevant." Id.
at 867); Hunt Food & Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 877 (1961) ('The Commission has issued a great
many pre-complaint subpoenas in the past forty-five years, and many of
them have been judicially upheld." Id. at 809); FTC v. Hallmark, Inc.,
265 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1959); FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc., 254 F.2d 598
(3d Cir.), affirming 150 F. Supp. 495 (M.D. Pa. 1957), cert. denied. 358
U.S. 867 (1958); FTC v. Rubin, 245 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1957); FTC v.
Reed, 243 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); Menzies
v. FTC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 957 (1957); FTC v.
Waltham Watch Co., 169 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
144. 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958).




149. 368 U.S. 208 (1961), affirming 285 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), affirming
in part and reversing in part 181 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
150. Id. at 223.
151. 304 U.S. 375, 386, 387 (1938).
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obedience of an FPC order prior to court enforcement has little,
if any, meaning today.
15. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Section 235(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952,152 which contains no immunity provision,'53 grants broad
subpoena powers to the Attorney General and all immigration of-
ficers; subpoenas may be enforced by court orders. In United
States v. Minker' the Court held that the word "witnesses" in
section 235 (a) does not extend to citizens who were themselves
the subject of denaturalization investigations.15 In one later in-
stance, however, the Court denied certiorari in a case where the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the word "wit-
nesses" did extend to an alien who was the subject of an in-
vestigative proceeding constituting the initial step in possible de-
portation proceedings against the alien." 6 The Court also de-
nied certiorari on an appeal from a decision that limited the Minker
holding to its precise facts and decided that the word "witnesses"
did extend to naturalized citizens even though they contended
that they might themselves be under investigation by the Service."5 7
152. 66 Stat. 198, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1958). The Attorney General is
charged with the administration and enforcement of this act. 66 Stat. 173
(1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1958). He is authorized to delegate his powers
to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. 66 Stat. 174
(1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1958). There is a further investiga-
tive subpoena provision in 66 Stat. 255 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1958)
in connection with the direction to the Attorney General to "designate
employees of the Service to conduct preliminary examinations upon peti-
tions for naturalization to any naturalization court and to make rccommen-
dations thereon to such court."
153. Claims of the privilege against self-incrimination were sustained in
Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938); Shaughnessy v.
Bacolas, 135 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dictum). But cf. Loufakis v.
United States, 81 F.2d 966, 967 (3d Cir. 1936); United States v. Lee
Hee, 60 F.2d 924, 925 (2d Cir. 1932). In Brown v. United States. 356
U.S. 148 (1958) a denaturalization case, the Court held that the petitioner,
a naturalized citizen, by taking the stand as a witness in her own behalf
had waived her privilege against self-incrimination and was subject to a
criminal contempt sentence for refusing, on fifth amendment grounds, to
answer certain questions on cross-examination.
154. 350 U.S. 179 (1956).
155. Id. at 190. In Lee Tin Mew v. Jones, 268 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1959),
the court answered in the negative "the question whether the statute was
intended to require a person resident in the country to give evidence as
to his citizenship." Id. at 379. Circuit Judge Walter L. Pope felt that "the
rationale which led to the decision in Minker is equally controlling here."
Id. at 380.
156. Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516, 517 (Ist Cir. 1961), cert. de-
nied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962).
157. United States v. Zuskar, 237 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied
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Section 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act forbids the
commingling of prosecuting and adjudicating functionsYm In
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath 59 the Supreme Court held that de-
portation proceedings had to conform to the requirements of
section 5(c), reasoning that the guarantee of a fair and unbiased
proceeding justifies the added inconvenience and expense to the
Immigration Service."e Congress subsequently altered the effect
of this holding. The Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1950,161
provided that proceedings directed toward the exclusion or ex-
pulsion of aliens were not to be governed by sections 5, 7, and 8
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 242(b) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952162 established a procedure
that permitted a special inquiry officer to take the dual role of
prosecutor and judge, presenting evidence, interrogating witnesses,
and making a determination as to deportability.
In Marcello v. Bond the Supreme Court held that section
242(b) supersedes the hearing provisions of section 5(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The Court concluded that the con-
tention that this*procedure violates due process was "without sub-
stance when considered against the long-standing practice in de-
portation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in
the federal courts, and against the special considerations appli-
cable to deportation which the Congress may take into account in
exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration mat-
ters."'1
sub nom. Budzileni v. United States, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957). For other
instances where the courts enforced, in whole or in part, investigative sub-
poenas in immigration cases see United States v. Vivian, 224 F.2d 53 (7th
Cir. 1955); cert. denied, 350 U.S. 953 (1956); United States v. Vivian,
217 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1955); Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746
(9th Cir. 1938); Loufakis v. United States, 81 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1936);
In re Estes, 86 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Tex. 1949).
158, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1958).
159. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
160.
Nor can we accord any weight to the argument that to apply the Act
to such hearings will cause inconvenience and added expense to the
Immigration Service. Of course it will, as it will to nearly every agency
to which it is applied. But the power of the purse belongs to Con-
gress, and Congress has determined that the price for greater fair-
ness is not too high ....
339 U.S. at 46-47.
161. Act of Sept. 27, 1950, ch. 1052, 64 Stat. 1048.
1.62. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958).
163. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
164. Id. at 311; accord, United States ex rel. Catalano v. Shaughnessy,
197 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1952): 'The combination of hearing and inves-
tigating functions in one person in deportation proceedings is not a denial
of due process."
1963]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:939
This commingling of prosecuting and adjudicating functions in
a special inquiry officer is reminiscent of the role of the French
Juge d'Instruction, whose powers will be considered in the next
installment of this Article. Of course, one must bear in mind that
our governmental officials treat aliens, and even naturalized citi-
zens, with somewhat less regard than they do those of us who are
born here.'
16. Internal Revenue Service.
The agency that has the oldest investigative subpoena powers,
the most varied as well as the most severe enforcement procedures,
and probably has issued the greatest number of such subpoenas
is the Internal Revenue Service. An 1864 act gave assessors power
to summon persons before them and, upon failure to comply with
the summons, to apply to a district judge for an "attachment... as
for a contempt"' 6  against that person. The judge was empowered to
order compliance with the summons and to punish the offender for
his disobedience. An 1866 act had a comparable provision, but re-
165. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (sustaining the
validity of a statutory provision that deprives an alien of his old-age in-
surance benefits upon his deportation for past Communist party member-
ship); Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 362 U.S. 390 (1960) (affirming a federal
district court decision that an alien was deportable for membership in the
Communist party, based on the court's disbelief of an alien's court tcsti-
mony); Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958) (holding six aliens physically
present in this country deportable to Communist China); Leng May Ma,
357 U.S. 185 (1958) (same); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (sanctioning
the use of secret informers in suspension of deportation proceedings); Gal-
van v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (sustaining the constitutionality of a sec-
tion of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which provided for the deporta-
tion of any alien who had been a member of the Communist party at any
time after entry); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953) (deciding, that the Attorney General could force a law-abiding
citizen to remain on Ellis Island without a hearing); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (sustaining the constitutionality of the Alien
Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), Title I of which is
better known as the Smith Act, 64 Stat. 808 (1948), as amended, 18
U.S.C. 2385 (1958), and holding that the United States could deport le-gally resident aliens because of former membership in the Communist
party); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (sustaining the claim of
the Attorney General, in a case involving five resident aliens, that under the
Internal Security Act of 1950 he had the power to deny them bail on
the basis of secret charges by secret informers and without affording them ahearing); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537(1950) (supporting the Attorney General, in the case of an alien war bride,
in his double claim that he had power not only to exclude her without ahearing but also that he did not have to reveal to anyone the material that
was the basis for his decision); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948)(holding judicially unreviewable the Attorney General's banishment of an
alien without a hearing on the basis of secret undisclosed information).
166. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 226-27.
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quired the judge's orders to be consistent "with the provisions
of existing laws for the punishment of contempts."''  These pro-
visions became section 3175 of the Revised Statutes of 1875, later
section 3615(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,", and
are now section 7604(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.169
The Internal Revenue Service also has available to it the usual
methods of court enforcement of administrative subpoenas. Section
7402(b) provides with reference to any subpoenaed person that
"the district court of the United States for the district in which
such person resides or shall be found shall have jurisdiction by
appropriate process to compel"17 obedience. In addition, sec-
tion 7210 imposes a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars or
imprisonment up to one year for disobedience of a subpoena."'
But, as in the case of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
there is no immunity provision. 7 2
The "attachment . . . as for a contempt" language in section
7604(b) has raised two questions not ordinarily encountered in
the enforcement of administrative subpoenas: does disobedience of
the subpoena prior to a court enforcement order constitute con-
167. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 101.
168. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3615(e), 53 Stat. 439 (1939).
169. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(b).
170. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7402(b).
171. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7210.
172. Claims of the privilege against self-incrimination have been sus-
tained in a number of cases. See, e.g., Warnell v. United States, 291
F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1961); Application of Howard, 210 F. Supp. 301 (W.D.
Pa. 1962); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956);
Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); In re Friedman,
104 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
Of course, the general inroads that have been made on the privilege have
also been applied here. In Application of Howard, supra, and United
States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955), the courts applied the
required records exception announced by the Court in Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). In Glotzbach v. Klavans, 196 F. Supp. 685(E.D. Va. 1961), the court held that the taxpayer had waived the privilege,
a result sanctioned by the Court in Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148(1958) and Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). In United States
v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963), affirming 210 F. Supp. 401
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), the court, following McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S.
372 (1960), and United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), excluded
certain documents from the privilege because they were held in a repre-
sentative capacity; accord, United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886
(D.NJ.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959).
An early case, In re Phillips, 19 Fed. Cas. 506 (No. 11097) (D.C. Va.
1869), applied the compulsory testimony provision in an Act of Feb. 25,
1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37, which became Rev. Stat. § 860 (1875).
But the Supreme Court later held, in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892), that the immunity provision was not broad enough to be ef-
fective; and Congress, a number of years thereafter, repealed the section.
Act of May 7, 1910, ch. 216, 36 Stat. 352.
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tempt? and is the court enforcement order interlocutory and there-
fore not appealable? Usually disobedience of an administrative
subpoena is not a contempt-the contempt lies in the failure to
obey a court enforcement order, and is for disrespect of the court.
But under section 7604(b) the courts have indicated that they will
go both ways. In Application of Colton'" Circuit Judge Friendly
for the Second Circuit indicated the possibility that under this sec-
tion "the judge or the commissioner might, if he so chose, punish
for contempt without giving the witness an opportunity to an-
swer."' 4 But in Brody v. United States'75 Chief Judge Calvert
Magruder for the First Circuit stated that
the proceeding was not strictly one of contempt, but was more ac-
curately a proceeding to obtain the assistance of the court in forcing
Brody to give the desired information to the Internal Revenue Service
by the device of having the court issue an order to that effect, dis-
obedience of which would be contempt punishable by the court.1 0
On the question of appealability, until section 7604(b) the
courts held that court enforcement orders of administrative sub-
poenas are final and appealable; 77 court orders enforcing court
173. 291 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1961). Subsequently the court affirmed the
district court's enforcement orders. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
174. Application of Colton, 291 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1961).
175. 243 F.2d 378 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
176. Id. at 381; accord, Reisman v. Caplin, 317 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (dictum): "We take it that such a hearing would be a necessary
preliminary to citing a summoned party for contempt for failure to comply
with a summons, and that a contempt order could not be summarily im-
posed."
In an early case, In re Kinney, 102 Fed. 468 (D.R.I. 1900), the court,
quoting the dictum in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489 (1894), in turn
expressed the dictum that if REV. STAT. § 3175 (1875) "does in fact author-
ize a judge or commissioner to arrest and punish for a contempt of the or-
der of the collector of internal revenue it is unconstitutional and void."
In re Kinney, supra at 468.
Several courts have held that disobedience of a court enforcement order
constitutes a civil contempt. See, e.g., McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S.
61 (1939); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956); Sauber v.
Whetstone, 199 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 928
(1953); In re Fahey, 192 F. Supp. 492 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd, 300 F.2d 383
(6th Cir. 1961); Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 205 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
177. Ellis v. ICC, 237 U.S. 434 (1915); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S.
407 (1908); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); United States v. Vivian,
224 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 953 (1956); United
States v. Vivian, 217 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1955); Penfield v. SEC, 143 F.2d
746 (9th Cir. 1944). There is, however, a body of suggestion that adminis-
trative agencies should themselves have contempt power. See, e.g., Alberts-
worth, Administrative Contempt Powers, A Problem in Technique, 25
A.B.A.J. 954 (1939); Parker, Contempt Procedure in the Enforcement of
Administrative Orders, 40 ILL. L. REV. 344 (1946); Sherwood, The En-forcement of Administrative Subpoenas, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1944);
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subpoenas, however, are not final and appealable."' 8
On the appealability of court enforcement orders under section
7604(b), the courts divided. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has concluded that they are interlocutory and not appeal-
able,17 while the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth,
and Eighth Circuits have reached a contrary result.280 The ques-
tion came before the Supreme Court in Davis v. Soja,'s ' but the
case was not disposed of on the merits because of a joint sugges-
tion of mootness.
Note, Use of Contempt Power to Enforce Subpoenas and Orders of Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1541 (1958). Professor Sherwood
stated his case this way: "It will be argued that administrative agencies
will abuse such authority. So they will; and so have the courts. Yet the
abuse of public and private rights which results from administrative action
too long postponed is just as serious as the occasional excess of authority
which is a part of all human institutions." Sherwood, supra at 547.
In contrast, Justice Murphy in his dissenting opinion in Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218-19 (1946), argued that ad-
ministrative agencies should have neither subpoena nor contempt power.
In answer to this argument, Professor Davis had stated:
One obvious difficulty with this view is that even if the subp'ena
power is confined exclusively to the judiciary, the result is that sub-
penas are issued not by judges but by clerks of court and by the
assistants who work in clerks' offices. For instance, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide that clerks "shall" issue on the request of
a party both subpenas for witnesses and subpenas for records,
"signed and seated but otherwise in blank." The traditional system
of the regular courts is thus to entrust the issuance of subpenas, that
is, the determination of whether and when and to whom they shall
be issued, to any lawyer who asks for the blanks.
1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 223 (1958). In United States v. Zuskar, 237
F.2d 528, 532-33 n.3 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nona. Budzileni v.
United States, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957), the court quoted a substantially similar
statement contained in DAVIs, ADMIISTRATIVE LAW 130 (1951).
178. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Alexander v.
United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).
179. Application of Davis, 303 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. granted
sub nor. Davis v. Soja, 371 U.S. 810 (1962); Jarecki v. Whetstone, 192
F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1951).
180. United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963); United
States v. MacDonald, 313 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1963); In re Turner, 309 F.2d
69 (2d Cir. 1962); Application of Colton, 291 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1961);
O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (lst Cir. 1958); Sale v. United States,
228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956); In re Albert
Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied
sub nom. Cincotta v. United States, 347 U.S. 960 (1954); Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); Brown-
son v. United States, 32 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1929). In First Nat. Bank v.
United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925), affirming per curiam 295 Fed. 142(S.D. Ala. 1924), the Supreme Court heard an appeal on the merits from
such an order, but did not discuss the problem. But cf. Goldfine v. Pastore,
261 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1958), relating to records in the control of Ber-
nard Goldfine or Mildred Paperman, where the court held that the "interim
order" there involved was not appealable.
181. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3415 (U.S. June 17, 1963).
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In addition to indicating that disobedience of a subpoena of the
Internal Revenue Service constitutes contempt, the Second Circuit,
in United States v. Becker,' affirmed a conviction under section
7210 for failure to produce subpoenaed documents. With refer-
ence to this decision Circuit Judge Friendly stated in Application of
Colton that "the criminal penalty of § 7210 is not contingent upon
prior action under either § 7604(a) or § 7604(b); that is what
the words say and we so applied them in United States v. Becker
"5183
Not only does the Internal Revenue Service have the oldest in-
vestigative subpoena powers, the most varied and harshest enforce-
ment procedures, and probably the greatest number of issued sub-
poenas, but also the courts by and large have always been liberal
in ordering enforcement of these subpoenas. Frequently the courts
have compared the subpoena powers of this agency to those of
a grand jury.' Some courts have been less liberal in enforcing
subpoenas, however, in cases where the statute of limitations is in
question or where the taxpayer contends that his books have al-
ready been inspected for the year in question. Section 6501 (a)
provides for a general statute of limitations of three years, which
paragraph (e) extends to six years if the understatement of gross
income for the year in question exceeds 25 per cent.' Section
7605(b) limits the Service to one inspection of the taxpayer's
books for each taxable year unless "the Secretary . . ., after in-
vestigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional in-
spection is necessary."'8 6
In O'Connor v. O'Connell'17 the court held that as a pre-
requisite to an enforcement order of a summons requiring a tax-
payer to testify as to a year on which the statute has run, the serv-
ice must establish a reasonable basis for suspicion of fraud.118
The Ninth Circuit has made a few comparable rulings,'8 9 but
182. 259 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959).
183. 291 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1961).
184. See, e.g., Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d
734, 737, 742 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); Brownson v.
United States, 32 F.2d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1929); United States v. First
Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716, 720 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Torras v. Stradley,
103 F. Supp. 737, 739-40 (N.D. Ga. 1952); Stone v. Frandle, 89 F. Supp.
222, 225 (D. Minn. 1950).
185. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6501(a), 6501(e).
186. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(b).
187. 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958).
188. Id. at 370.
189. Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1957); Local 174,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir.
1956) (investigation of the income tax returns of Frank W. Brewster and
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these latter rulings were exceptional. In most of the circuit courts
of appeals, the Internal Revenue Service has obtained almost
everything requested in the court enforcement of its subpoenas.
One of the strongest statements in its favor came from the second
circuit in Foster v. United States, ' 9 the court stated that the
relevancy test to be applied in determining the propriety of an en-
forcement order is "the same as that for materiality with respect
to grand jury investigations . . . It is whether the inspection sought
'might have thrown light upon' the correctness of the taxpayer's
returns . ... "I Moreover, there are many cases in the various
circuits enforcing subpoenas of the Internal Revenue Service, in-
cluding subpoenas issued in investigations involving closed years."
his wife); Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942);
Arend v. De Masters, 181 F. Supp. 761 (D. Ore. 1960). In the first two
cases the court stressed the fact that those subpoenaed were third persons
to the investigation. District Judge Irving R. Kaufman by way of dictum
made the same point in Application of Levine, 149 F. Supp. 642, 643
(S.D. N.Y.), affd per curiam, 243 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1956): "The ques-
tion of probable cause for such investigations comes into play when a third
party is requested to produce records relating to the taxpayer under in-
vestigation." But the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the
later case of Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959), qualified this dictum with the explanation:
'The context makes it plain that by this was meant only that a motion to
enforce a subpoena against a third party should show some connection be-
tween the respondent and the taxpayer under investigation from which it
may be reasonably believed that the respondent may have information
relative to the investigation which justifies the burden of compliance."
190. 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
191. Id. at 186-87. But in Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35, 39 n.6
(9th Cir. 1957), the court drew a distinction between a grand jury investi-
gation and that of an executive agency.
192. See, e.g., Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963),
affirming 200 F. Supp. 541 (D. Minn. 1961); Application of Magnus,
299 F.2d 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962); Eberhart v.
Broadrock Development Corp., 296 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 871 (1962); Wall v. Mitchell, 287 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1961); Mc-
Dermott v. John Baumgarth Co., 286 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1961); Lash v.
Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960);
National Plate & Window Glass Co. v. United States, 254 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958); Application of United States, 246 F.2d
762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957); Corbin Deposit Bank v.
United States, 244 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1957); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d
767 (9th Cir. 1956); Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148 (5th
Cir. 1956); Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 1006 (1956); Beatty v. United States, 227 F.2d 350 (8th Cir.
1955); Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 212 F.2d 86
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838 (1954); In re Albert Lindley Lee
Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953); Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); United States v.
United Distillers Products Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946); Zimmermann
v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939); Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 205 F. Supp.
1 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
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The Service was one of the agencies, along with the FCC, the
FTC, and the SEC that retained its previous restrictions on the
right of subpoenaed persons to counsel despite the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The courts, as has been seen, at
first sustained these restrictions, 9 ' but in Backer v. Commission-
er"" finally held section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act to be fully applicable.
17. Interstate Commerce Commission.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has subpoena powers un-
der four acts: part 1.. of the Interstate Commerce Act, passed
in 1887; part II,' originally passed as the Motor Carrier Act of
1935;1g1 part III,98 the Water Carrier Act of 1940; and part
IV, 99 the Freight Forwarders Act of 1942. The compulsory testi-
mony provision is contained in the 1893 amendment to the In-
terstate Commerce Act."'0 Under the 1893 act, an individual ob-
tained immunity without claiming his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.2"' In the early case of Brown v. Walker"2 and in the
recent case of Brown v. United States, 20 3 the Supreme Court spe-
cifically sustained the validity of this compulsory testimony provi-
sion.
In ICC v. Brimson2 14 the Supreme Court set the pattern for
193. Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952); United
States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1949). See text accompanying
notes 28 & 29 supra.
194. 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960). In In re Neil, 209 F. Supp. 76
(S.D. W. Va. 1962), the court ruled that under section 6(b) subpoenaed
witnesses were to "be furnished a copy of the official transcript of their
testimony without first being required to sign the original thereof." Id.
at 79. But in United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 820-21 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962), the court held that section 6(b) did not
apply to statements which a taxpayer made voluntarily.
195. 24 Stat. 383 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
196. 49 Stat. 548, 550 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 305(d) (1958).
197. 49 Stat. 543. The Water Carrier Act changed the short title to
"part II of the Interstate Commerce Act." 54 Stat. 919 (1940).
198. 54 Stat. 946, 49 U.S.C. § 916 (1958).
199. 56 Stat. 746, 49 U. S.C. § 1017 (1958).
200. 27 Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
201. See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
202. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
203. 359 U.S. 41 (1959). For a history of compulsory testimony provi-
sions, see ROGGE, THE FIRST AND THE FIFTH 204-08 (1960); Rogge, Corn-
pelling the Testimony of Political Deviants, 55 MICH. L. REV. 163, 375-
83 (1956-57).
Although the compulsory testimony provision contains a broad grant
of immunity, the right to counsel is limited to representation by a practi-
tioner. 49 C.F.R. § 1.71(a) (1963).
204. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
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court enforcement of administrative subpoenas. Referring to the
ICC's power to enforce its own subpoenas, the Court stated:
Such a body could not, under our system of government, and con-
sistently with due process of law, be invested with authority to compel
obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment .... Of
course, the question of punishing the defendants for contempt could
not arise before the Commission; for, in a judicial sense, there is no
such thing as contempt of a subordinate administrative body. No ques-
tion of contempt could arise until the issue of law, in the Circuit Court,
is determined adversely to the defendants and they refuse to obey, not
the order of the Commission, but the final order of the court. ...so
In an earlier case, Anderson v. Dunn," involving contempt of
the federal House of Representatives, the Court expressed a similar
dictum: "[Neither analogy nor precedent would support the as-
sertion of such powers in any other than a legislative or judicial
body."2 07
Whether, in the light of the Court's current attitude toward
the enforcement of investigative subpoenas and orders of ad-
ministrative agencies, as expressed in such cases as CAB v. Her-
mann20 and St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States,209 these dicta
still represent the law is an open question. Like the FTC, the
ICC has witnessed a reversal of the Court's attitude toward admin-
istrative investigations. In Harriman v. ICC1 0 the Court in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, held that the ICC could not re-
quire testimony in an- investigation begun on its own motion. In
Ellis v. ICC21- the Court, again in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes, concluded that the ICC had no authority to conduct "a
fishing expedition into the affairs of a stranger for the chance that
something discreditable might turn up.""2 The result in this
case foretold the similar decision by a unanimous Court in FTC v.
American Tobacco Co."1 s
Congress sought to alter the Harriman result by expressly giving
the ICC authority to investigate, on its own motion, any matter
"concerning which any question may arise under any of the pro-
visions of this Act,"'214 and the Court accepted the alteration in
205. Id. at 485, 488-89.
206. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
207. Id. at 233-34.
208. 353 U.S. 322 (1957). See text accompanying note 3 supra.
209. 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
210. 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
211. 237 U.S. 434 (1915).
212. Id. at 445.
213. 264 U.S. 298 (1924). See text accompanying note I supra.
214. 36 Stat. 551 (1910), 49 U.S.C. § 13(2) (1958). The Motor Carrier
Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 547, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 304(a)(4a), 304(c)
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Smith v. ICC.215 The "fishing expedition" objection to adminis-




The six separate provisions that empower the Secretary of Labor
or his delegate to investigate with the aid of subpoenas occur, in
the order of their enactment, in the United States Employees' Com-
pensation Act,217 the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act,2 18
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,219 a 1958 amendment to
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 20
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195 9,221
and a 1962 amendment to the Welfare and Pension Plans Dis-
closure Act.222 Only three of these acts contain compulsory testi-
mony provisions. These three, the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938,223 the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959,"2 and the 1962 amendment to the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act,225 all adopt the enforcement procedures of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, including the criminal sanc-
tions.
Because contested cases involving the enforcement of investiga-
tive subpoenas of the Labor Department are so recent, the courts
have generally enforced such subpoenas after only a negligible
amount of judicial examination. The rules for enforcement were
laid down in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,226 which arose
under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, relating to minimum
(1958), the Water Carrier Act, 54 Stat. 946 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 916(c)(1958), and the Freight Forwarders Act, 56 Stat. 746 (1942), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1017(c) (1958) empowered the ICC, in certain areas, to proceed on its
own motion.
215. 245 U.S. 33 (1917).
216. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
217. 39 Stat. 748 (1916), 5 U.S.C. § 780 (1958). This act was at first
administered by the United States Employees' Compensation Commission.
This body was abolished in 1946, and its functions were transferred to the
Federal Security Agency, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1946, § 3, 60 Stat.
1095 (1946). In 1950 the relevant functions of the Federal Security Ad-
ministrator were transferred to the Secretary of Labor. Reorganization
Plan No. 19 of 1940, 64 Stat. 1271 (1950).
218. 49 Stat. 2038 (1936); 41 U.S.C. § 39 (1958).
219. 52 Stat. 1065, 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1958).
220. 72 Stat. 835, 33 U.S.C. § 941(b) (1958).
221. 73 Stat. 539, 29 U.S.C.A. § 521 (Supp. 1962).
222. 76 Stat. 37, 29 U.S.C.A. § 308 (Supp. 1962).
223. 52 Stat. 1065 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1958).
224. 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 521(b) (Supp. 1962).
225. 72 Stat. 1002 (1958), 29 U.S.C. § 308(e) (1958).
226. 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
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wages and hours of labor of persons employed on government con-
tracts, and in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,m in-
volving the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In Endicott Johnson
Corp. the district court refused to enforce the subpoena because
the Secretary of Labor sought evidence of underpayment before
she had made a decision on the question of coverage. Instead, the
court tried the issue of coverage itself and decided it against the
Secretary. The Supreme Court, however, held the district court in
error for deciding the coverage issue and ordered the enforcement
of the subpoena.2" In the Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. case,
the Court compared the role of the Administrator of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 to that of a grand jury and held that if his
investigation was for a lawfully authorized purpose, his subpoena
should be enforced. '
In two recent cases under the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, United States courts of appeals held
that no showing of probable cause was necessary for the enforce-
ment of administrative subpoenas." ° In the first of these, the court
reasoned that if a showing of probable violation of the act were a
condition precedent to investigation, the Secretary would be strip-
ped of his power to investigate."m ' Holdings such as this reduce
the role of courts to that of pro forma enforcement agencies for ad-
ministrative subpoenas.
In addition to the assurance that Labor Department subpoenas
will be enforced, the Secretary of Labor is empowered to "utilize
the facilities or services of any department, agency, or establish-
ment of the United States or of any State or political subdivision
of a State, including the services of any of its employees. .... 232
227. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
228. 317 U.S. at 509.
229. 327 U.S. at 209, 216. There were many comparable rulings. See,
e.g., Tobin v. Banks & Rumbaugh, 201 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 942 (1953); McComb v. Hunsaker Trucking Contractor, Inc., 171
F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1948); Walling v. La Belle S.S. Co., 148 F.2d 198(6th Cir. 1945); Wailing v. Golebiewski, 142 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1944);
Walling v. Benson, 137 F.2d 501 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 791(1943); Mississippi Rd. Supply Co. v. Walling, 136 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 752 (1943); Walling v. American Rolbal Corp., 135
F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1943); Martin Typewriter Co. v. Walling, 135 F.2d
918 (1st Cir. 1943); Walling v. Standard Dredging Corp., 132 F.2d 322(2d Cir.), affirming per curiam 44 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 761 (1943); Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114
F.2d 384 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940).
230. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Goldberg, 303 F.2d 402 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 938 (1962); Goldberg v. Truck Drivers Local
299, 293 F.2d 807 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961).
231. Id. at 812.
232. 73 Stat. 540 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 527 (Supp. 1962).
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Pursuant to this provision, the Secretary of Labor and the Attor-
ney General published a Memorandum of Understanding by which,
on an ad hoc basis, the Department of Justice under delegation
from the Secretary of Labor was to investigate criminal matters
arising under certain portions of the act.233 This agreement was
sustained in Goldberg v. Battles"' despite the objection that it
constituted a delegation of authority repugnant to "all principles
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 2 35
The procedure sustained in this case becomes more arresting
upon reflection that, except for grand jury subpoenas, neither the
Department of Justice nor the FBI has investigative subpoena pow-
ers. Moreover, aside from such specific acts or provisions as the
Immunity Act of 1954,236 which is limited to investigations into
treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, and
the overthrow of the government by force and violence, neither
the Department of Justice nor the FBI has available to it any gen-
eral compulsory testimony provision. Once again, as in the compar-
able mingling of prosecutive and adjudicative functions in the spe-
cial inquiry officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
this is reminiscent of the powers of the French Juge d'Instruction,
to be discussed later.
The rules and regulations of the Labor Department do not pro-
vide for counsel in investigative hearings.23 ' There is, however,
provision for counsel in adjudicatory proceedings such as those
conducted under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act.238
19. National Labor Relations Board.
The National Labor Relations Board has the authority to inves-
tigate petitions relating to union representation of employees "
and unfair labor practices.240 Although the Board's rules and reg-
233. 25 Fed. Reg. 1708 (1960).
234. 196 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aIf'd per curtam, 299 F.2d
937 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962).
235. 196 F. Supp. at 755. Cf. Serio v. Liss, 189 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.J.
1960), aff'd, 300 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1961), where the court stated: "The
Attorney General was, therefore, amply authorized to investigate (in behalf
of the Secretary) the incumbency of the plaintiff in the office of business
agent of the defendant Local and to express to that defendant his belief
that the plaintiff was illegally occupying his office." 189 F. Supp. at 364.
236. 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1958).
237. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 13.6, 521.10, 525.14 (1963).
238. 29 C.F.R. § 12.10(a) (1963). See also 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.8(f)
(1963).
239. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1958).
240. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1958).
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ulations do not provide for counsel in investigative proceedings,"'
they either provide for or contemplate the right of representation in
adjudicative hearings.2" The National Labor Relations Act con-
tains a grant of subpoena powers and a compulsory testimony pro-
vision of the type that began with the Securities Act of 1933.243
In the field of labor there are thus seven different statutes that
confer investigative powers. Four of the seven also contain com-
pulsory testimony provisions, but even these are not all alike.
Three of these four, those relating to the Labor Department, have
the older kind of immunity provision, which gives a subpoenaed
witness immunity whether he claims his privilege against self-in-
crimination or not.
20. National Wage Stabilization Board.
The War Labor Disputes Act2" conferred on the chairman of
the National War Labor Board" 5 investigative subpoena pow-
ers.. similar to those given to the President by title I of the
Second War Powers Act of 1942.47 This included a compulsory
testimony provision under which subpoenaed persons had to claim
their privilege -against self-incrimination to obtain immunity.
On December 31, 1945 the President created within the De-
partment of Labor the National Wage Stabilization Board and trans-
ferred to it the powers and functions, including subpoena powers,
of the National War Labor Board relating to the stabilization of
wages and salaries." The courts have enforced investigative sub-
241. See, e.g., -29 C.F.R. §§ 101.4, 101.18, 101.22, 101.27, 101.32,
102.63, 102.77 & 102.85 (1963).
242. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.10, 101.20, 101.30, 101.34, 102.38,
102.66, 102.86 & 102.90 (1963).
243. 49 Stat. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1958).
The courts have been quite liberal in enforcing the Board's subpoenas.
See, e.g., Lewis v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 10 (1958); NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co.,
357 U.S. 1 (1958); NLRB v. C.C.C. Associates, 306 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.
1962); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 300 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1962), af-
firming per curiam 200 F. Supp. 48 (D. Conn. 1961); Storkline Corp. v.
NLRB, 298 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Kingston Trap Rock Co.,
222 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1955); Jackson Packing Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d
842 (5th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills. 197 F.2d 447 (5th
Cir. 1952); Edwards v. NLRB, 189 F.2d 970 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 870 (1951); NLRB v. John S. Barnes Corp., 178 F.2d 156 (7th Cir.
1949); D.G. Bland Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1949);
NLRB v. Northern Trust Co., 148 F.2d 24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 731 (1945); NLRB v. Barrett Co., 120 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1941);
NLRB v. Thayer, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mass. 1962); NLRB v. Roddy
Mfg. Co., 165 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1958).
244. 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
245. Created by Exec, Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942).
246. Act of June 25, 1943, ch. 144, §§ 7(a), (b), 57 Stat. 166.
247. 56 Stat. 177, 179, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 633, 1152(a)(4) (1958).
248. Exec. Order No. 9672, 11 Fed. Reg. 221 (1946).
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poenas of the Chairman of the National War Labor Board24 as
well as of the Chairman of the National Wage Stabilization
Board.25 0
21. Office of Price Administration.
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 created the Office
of Price Administration under the direction of a Price Adminis-
trator.2 5' The Administrator had investigative subpoena powers,
supplemented by a compulsory testimony provision under which
a subpoenaed person had to claim his privilege against self-in-
crimination to obtain immunity. 52
The courts were as liberal in enforcing OPA subpoenas as
those of any of the administrative agencies. In Bowles v. Baer"'
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, after comparing
OPA investigations to grand jury proceedings, held that sub-
poenaed persons were not entitled either to counsel or to their own
reporter. 54 In Shapiro v. United States2"5 the Supreme Court
announced its required records inroad on the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination; the court reasoned that since
the records in question were required by OPA regulations, they
were public documents not within the scope of the fifth amend-
ment's privilege.
The courts enforced the Price Administrator's subpoenas and in-
spection orders despite "fishing expedition"2 6 and "no showing
249. In Troy Laundry Co. v. Lockwood, 63 F. Supp. 384, 385 (S.D.
Cal. 1945), the court, in dismissing an amended complaint for injunctive
relief, held that there could be no judicial interference with the subpoena
power of the National War Labor Board "upon the ground that the power
might be abused by those conducting the investigation." But cf. S & W Caf-
eteria v. Aird, 60 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Tenn. 1945).
250. In Troy Laundry Co. v. Wirtz, 155 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 723 (1946), the chairman of the National Wage Stabiliza-
tion Board substituted for the chairman of the National War Labor Board,
and the court affirmed an enforcement order despite the objection that
"the knowledge of the documents sought was obtained by a prior illegal
search."
251. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 201, 56 Stat. 29.
252. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 202, 56 Stat. 30
(1942).
253. 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944).
254. Id. at 789.
255. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). But in Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137
(1949), the Court held that the subpoenaed petitioner did obtain immunity.
However, Smith was subsequently convicted for income tax evasion for
one of the years as to which he testified and two later years. United
States v. Smith, 206 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1953).
256. Dossett v. Porter, 161 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
771 (1947); Provenzano v. Porter, 159 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1946), cert.
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of probable cause"' "r objections and claims that such subpoenas
and orders violate the fourth amendment's provision against un-
reasonable searches and seizures2 58 and the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination." 9 The basis of these enforce-
ments was the "presumption of regularity attending acts of ad-
ministrative agencies. ' 21
In December, 1946 the President consolidated the OPA and
three other agencies into the Office of Temporary Controls. 2 1 In
one case in which the Temporary Controls Administrator substitut-
ed for the Price Administrator, who had resigned, the Court held
that the Price Administrator could delegate to district directors au-
thority to sign and issue subpoenas.262
22. Pacific Railway Commission.
In the month after the enactment of the first Interstate Com-
merce Act, Congress created the Pacific Railway Commission to
investigate railroads that had received aid from the federal gov-
ernment and gave the commissioners investigative subpoena pow-
ers. 63 If a subpoenaed person was contumacious, any circuit or
denied, 331 U.S. 816 (1947); Bowles v. Shawano Nat'l Bank, 151 F.2d
749 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 781 (1946).
257. Dossett v. Porter, 161 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
771 (1947); Provenzano v. Porter, 159 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 816 (1947); Raley v. Porter, 156 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1946), affd sub nonz. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331
U.S. 111 (1947); Hagen v. Porter, 156 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 729 (1946); Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1945).
258. Porter v. Murray, 156 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1946), petition for cert.
dismissed on motion of petitioner, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Hagen v. Porter,
156 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 729 (1946); Porter v.
Mueller, 156 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1946); Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91 (3d
Cir. 1945); cf. Bowles v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1945).
259. Dossett v. Porter, 161 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
771 (1947) (required records exception); Hagen v. Porter, 156 F.2d
362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 729 (1946) (same); Porter v. Mueller,
156 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1946) (same); Cudmore v. Bowles, 145 F.2d 697(D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 841 (1945); cf. Bowles v. Glick
Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877
(1945).
260. Bowles v. Northwest Poultry & Dairy Prods. Co., 153 F.2d 32,
34 (9th Cir. 1946). For other cases where the courts ordered enforcement
of the Price Administrator's subpoenas or inspection orders, see Porter v.
Gantner & Mattem Co., 156 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1946); Pinkus v. Porter,
155 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1946); Porter v. MeColloch, 154 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.
1946); Bowles v. Bay of New York Coal & Supply Corp., 152 F.2d 330(2d Cir. 1945); Bowles v. Abendroth, 151 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1945); Bowles
v. Rothman, 145 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1944).
261. Exec. Order No. 9809, 11 Fed. Reg. 14281 (1946).
262. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. I 11 (1947).
263. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 345, § 2, 24 Stat. 488, 491.
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district court of the United States within whose jurisdiction the
inquiry was being conducted could order that person to appear
before the appropriate commissioner. The compulsory testimony
provision was held, in Counselman v. Hitchcock,' to be too
narrow to be effective.
The Commission's application for enforcement of its investiga-
tive subpoena against Leland Stanford was denied in In the Matter
of Pacific Ry. Comm'n in 1887.265 At this early date the court was of
the opinion that it should not participate in an administrative inves-
tigation.2 66 Of course, this was before ICC v. Brimson,1° in which
the Supreme Court held that a comparable application under the
Interstate Commerce Act did constitute a "case" to which federal
judicial power constitutionally extended."' 8
23. The President.
The Second War Powers Act of 1942269 and the Defense Pro-
duction Act of 1950, as amended by the Defense Production Act
Amendments of 1951,270 gave investigative subpoena powers to
the President. Under the 1942 act, the President may subpoena
the attendance and testimony of a witness and any books, rec-
ords, or other evidence that may be relevant to the inquiry; the
1950 act empowered the President by subpoena "to take the sworn
testimony of, any person as may be necessary or appropriate." ''
In order to clarify any doubt as to the President's investigative
powers, the 1951 amendments added, after "testimony of," the
words "and administer oaths and affirmations to." Both acts con-
tain compulsory testimony provisions that require subpoenaed
persons to claim their privilege against self-incrimination to obtain
immunity. Moreover, the Second Decontrol Act of 1947272 ex-
empted the President's inquisitive functions under the 1942 act from
all provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act except sections
3 and 10, which relate to the publication of information and to
judicial review of agency action. The President's inquisitive func-
tions under the 1950 act as amended were extended to June 30,
1964.273
264. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
265. 32 Fed. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1887).
266. Id. at 258.
267. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
268. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
269. 56 Stat. 177, 179, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 633, 1152(a)(4) (1958).
270. 64 Stat. 816, 65 Stat. 139, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2155 (1958).
271. Ibid.
272. Act of July 15, 1947, ch. 248, § 5, 61 Stat. 323.
273. 76 Stat. 112 (1962), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2166(a) (Supp. 1962).
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During World War H the President delegated his powers appli-
cable to the nation's food program to the Secretary of Agriculture
and the War Food Administrator.""7 They in turn delegated their
subpoena powers to "all persons now or hereafter employed as at-
torneys in the Office of the Solicitor."'"z 5 In United States v.
Cream Prods. Distrib. Co.,278 the court sustained these delega-
tions over objections that a subpoena duces tecum constitutes a
fishing expedition, and violates the fourth amendment's provi-
sion against unreasonable searches and seizures and the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
The day after the enactment of the 1950 act, the President
created an Economic Stabilization Agency, under an Adminis-
trator, and within the Agency, a Director of Price Stabilization.'
The Administrator created the Office of Price Stabilization. The
courts enforced the subpoenas of the Director of the OPS as gen-
erously as they did those of the Administrator of the OPA. In
one case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
an inspection order over objections that the demanded documents
were not relevant to the purpose of the inquiry, that there was an
absence of probable cause, and that the inspection order amounted
to harassment. The court stated that probable cause is not a pre-
requisite to inspection and that harassment is not a proper ob-
jection to a subpoena.' 8 In another case, the same court sus-
tained such an order despite objections that it violated the fourth
amendment's provision against unreasonable searches and seizures
and the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and
that it-constituted harassment.29 To defeat the claim of privi-
lege, the court applied the required records exception that the Su-
preme Court announced in Shapiro v. United States."0 One district
court, in compelling the production of documents before a district
enforcement director, summarily dismissed an objection that this
official was engaged in a fishing- expedition,2s1 while another
district court, in ordering compliance with subpoenas duces tecum,
274. Exec. Orders Nos. 9280, 9322, 9334, 7 Fed. Reg. 10179 (1942),
8 Fed. Reg. 3807, 5423 (1943).
275. 10 Fed. Reg. 8183 (1945).
276. 156 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1946).
277. Exec. Order No. 10161, §§ 401(a), 402, 15 Fed. Reg. 6105, 6106
(1950).
278. Westside Ford v. United States, 206 F.2d 627, 632, 635 (9th Cir.
1953).
279. Wockner v. United States, 211 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1954).
280. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
281. In re Bleichfeld Bag & Burlap Co., 105 F. Supp. 162 (W.D.N.Y.
1952).
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refused to permit counsel for the subpoenaed persons to be present
during the investigation.282
A third act, the Trading with the Enemy Act, passed during
World War I, as amended, empowers the President during the time
of war or any other period of national emergency to investigate
transactions with any foreign country or its nationals and com-
mands him to "require any person to keep a full record of, and
to furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise, complete
information relative to any act or transaction referred to."2 3 The
act contains no compulsory testimony provision.
In 1942 the President delegated these powers to the Secretary of
the Treasury. 4 The courts have enforced administrative orders
in the nature of subpoenas duces tecum of the acting director of
the Foreign Assets Control Division of the Treasury Department."a'
But one court indicated that, apart from records held in a repre-
sentative capacity and records falling within the required records
doctrine, it would sustain a claim of the privilege against self-in-
crimination.286
24. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Like the Agriculture Department and the Labor Department,
the Securities and Exchange Commission administers six different
statutes that contain provisions under which one-man investigators
with subpoena powers function. In chronological order, these pro-
visions are in the Securities Act of 1933,17 the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,28' the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935,289 the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,290 the Investment
Company Act of 1940,291 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.292 All six acts contain compulsory testimony provisions un-
der which subpoenaed persons first have to claim their privilege to
obtain immunity.
Aside from an early case, Jones v. SEC, 93 in which Mr. Jus-
282. Application of Compton, 101 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex. 1951).
283. 40 Stat. 415 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1958).
284. 7 Fed. Reg. 1409 (1942).
285. Wagman v. Arnold, 257 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1958), affirming in part
and reversing in part 152 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); In re Indusco,
Inc., 15 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
286. Wagman v. Arnold. 257 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1958).
287. 48 Stat. 85, 86, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 77v (1958).
288. 48 Stat. 899, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1958).
289. 49 Stat. 831, 15 U.S.C. § 79r (1958).
290. 53 Stat. 1174, 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu (1958).
291. 54 Stat. 842, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958).
292. 54 Stat. 853, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1958).
293. 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
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tice Sutherland for the Court brought forward the "fishing expe-
dition" objection to administrative investigations, 4 the SEC's
subpoenas have usually been enforced. In the case of Penfield
Co. v. SEC, 5 the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in its sub-
stitution of imprisonment for a fine, the imprisonment to continue
until the subpoenaed witness produced the documents in question.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson joined, cautioned that "courts were not to be automata
carrying out the wishes of the administrative."29- The next month,
in Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co.,297 Mr. Justice
Jackson, in a concurring opinion, referred to this dissent in ex-
pressing the fear that in the enforcement of administrative sub-
poenas, courts were tending "to be shorn of their power of in-
dependent inquiry. '29s Three terms later Mr. Justice Jackson deliv-
ered the Court's opinion in United States v. Morton Salt Co.,"9 ap-
parently convinced that the growing necessity of investigative ex-
pediency had outdated his earlier position.
Despite the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act, the
SEC, as has been seen, restricts subpoenaed witnesses in their
choice of counsel and then limits counsel in their role. Several
cases have brushed aside "fishing expedition" objections.301 In
one of these, McGarry v. SEC,3 ' the court stated that there was
no basis for the contention.302 In various additional cases the
courts, comparing SEC investigations to grand jury proceedings, 3
overruled objections that the SEC was without jurisdiction, that
the subpoenas violated the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination, that there was no showing of probable cause, that
the subpoenas were too broad and exploratory, that they were
294. Id. at 26.
295. 330 U.S. 585 (1947), affirming 157 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1946).
296. 330 U.S. at 604.
297. 331 U.S. 111 (1947).
298. Id. at 124.
299. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
300. McGarry v. SEC, 147 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1945); In re Verser-
Clay Co., 98 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 639
(1939); Consolidated Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1938); Newfield
v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700 (5th. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 729 (1937); Mc-
Mann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), affirming 16 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y.
1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
301. 147 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1945).
302. 147 F.2d at 392.
303. See, e.g., Consolidated Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1938);
Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
614 (1938); In re SEC, 14 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 84 F.2d 316
(2d Cir.), rev'd for- mootness sub nom. Bracken v. SEC, 299 U.S. 504
(1936).
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too vague and uncertain, that they were unreasonable and unnec-
essarily burdensome, and that the documents sought were not
relevant to the inquiry.' 4
25. United States Tariff Commission.
The Commission is empowered to issue subpoenas for any in-
vestigation authorized by law." 5 Under the Tariff Act of 1930,00
this body is empowered to investigate the administration, the fiscal
and industrial effects, and the operation of customs laws, the tariff
relations between the United States and foreign countries, and
upon either sworn complaint or its own initiative, unfair import
practices. It is commanded to make such investigations as the
President, either branch of Congress, the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, or the House Ways and Means Committee request. 07 There
is no compulsory testimony provision. The rules and regula-
tions of the Commission provide for representation only in public
hearings.0
26. Veterans' Administration.
The third administrative or executive official with investigative
subpoena powers was the predecessor of the Administrator of the
Veterans' Administration, the Commissioner of Pensions. The
initial act, passed in 1882, did not, however, empower the Commis-
sioner himself to issue subpoenas, but rather, it empowered any
judge or clerk of any federal court on the Commissioner's applica-
tion to subpoena any witness within its jurisdiction.3 9 There was
no compulsory testimony provision, although the limited immunity
304. Mines & Metals Corp. v. SEC, 200 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); SEC v. Vacuum Can Co., 157 F.2d 530
(7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 820 (1947); SEC v. Minas de Arte-
misa, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945); SEC v. National Bank of Commerce.
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91221 (W.D. Wash. April 23, 1963). But cf.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100 (D.C.
Cir. 1939).
In United States v. Eisele, 52 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1943), and United
States v. Goodner, 35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940), the court held that
subpoenaed persons had obtained immunity from prosecution. In Edwards
v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941), the Court ruled that the defendant
was entitled to an opportunity to prove this defense. However, he failed to
do so. Edwards v. United States, 131 F.2d 198 (10th Cir.), cert. denied.
317 U.S. 689 (1942).
305. 46 Stat. 699 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
306. 46 Stat. 590, 19 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
307. 46 Stat. 698, 703, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1337 (1958).
308. 19 C.F.R. § 201.13 (1963).
309. Act of July 25, 1882, ch. 349, § 2, 22 Stat. 175.
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provision in section 860 of the Revised Statutes existed, which the
Supreme Court held insufficient in Counselman v. Hitchcock."'
An 'early case,-" relying on In the Matter of Pacific Ry.
Comm'n, refused to honor a request for an investigative subpoena
under the 1882 act. A case 3 decided after ICC v. Brimson-14 held
the 1882 act constitutional, but nevertheless denied the application
of the Commissioner of Pensions by following a strict approach to
the statute.
Two other early cases deserve discussion. In one case, United
States v. Bell,315 involving an indictment for perjury in an exami-
nation before a pension examiner, the court excluded the exami-
nation and acquitted the defendant because he was not advised of
his privilege against self-incrimination. 316 In the other, In re
O'Shea,317 the court refused to hold a subpoenaed witness in
contempt for declining to appear, basing its decision on the ground
that the investigative proceeding was ex parte. 318
Today, for investigations of any matter within the jurisdiction
of the VA, the Administrator may subpoena persons within 100
miles of the hearing.319 Also, there is still no compulsory testi-
mony provision and no provision for counsel in investigative pro-
ceedings.
Although the Administrator of the VA has fared better in ob-
taining court aid in his investigative proceedings than his predeces-
sor, the Commissioner of Pensions, he has not done as well as, for
example, the Price Administrator. The courts have enforced his
investigative subpoenas despite objections that he was exceeding his
jurisdiction32 and that his subpoena was oppressive, but the
310. 142 U.S. 587 (1892).
311. In re McLean, 37 Fed. 648 (E.D.N.Y. 1888).
312. 32 Fed. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1887).
313. In re Gross, 78 Fed. 107 (E.D. La. 1897).
314. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
315. 81 Fed. 830 (W.D. Tenn. 1897).
316. 81 Fed. at 853-54.
317. 166 Fed. 180 (D.N.J. 1908).
318.
The possibility of converting these administrative examinations into
very obnoxious inquisitorial proceedings is apparent ... [The de-
fendants] should have notice of the time and place of the examination.
Their attorney may represent them at the examination. And if, in
the course of the examination, any questions are propounded to Miss
O'Shea, the answers to which will tend to incriminate her, she may
refuse to answer them ....
Id. at 183.
319. 72 Stat. 1237 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 3311 (1958).
320. General Trades School v. United States, 212 F.2d 656 (8th Cir.
1954); Carroll Vocational Institute v. United States, 211 F.2d 539 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954).
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ninth circuit, in denying him relief, pointed out that there was
"no power to compel a court to rubberstamp action of an adminis-
trative agency simply because the latter demands such action."3 '
If courts have become little more than automata in the enforce-
ment of administrative subpoenas, it appears that some judges still
do not like to be reminded of this fact.
27. Aberrant Instances.
In addition to these two dozen and more executive and adminis-
trative agencies who have been invested with investigative subpoena
powers, there were two aberrant instances of inquiries by officials,
one of which the Supreme Court approved and the other of which
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit condoned, that
should have been condemned. One involved questioning by a fed-
eral district judge in camera, and the other by a prosecutor in pri-
vate.
In Levine v. United States322 a federal district judge cleared the
courtroom and asked a grand jury witness the questions that the
witness had refused to answer before the grand jury, claiming his
privilege against self-incrimination. When he again refused, the
judge sentenced him to a one-year prison term. The Supreme Court
sustained this sentence although admittedly "the contemptuous
conduct, the adjudication of guilt, and the imposition of sentence
all took place after the public had been excluded from the court-
room." '323 The Court split five to four, as it so often does on
close questions of this nature. Mr. Justice Black wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas
joined, and Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Mr. Justice Douglas likewise joined.
The other aberrant instance arose in United States v. Standard
Oil Co.,324 a Sherman Act case. A witness in a criminal trial had
been subpoenaed to appear in the United States Attorney's of-
fice during hours when the court was not in session. He was de-
nied the right to counsel in one of these after-hour proceedings.
There was no legal basis whatever for this practice, but the court,
although reversing judgments of conviction for other reasons,
merely conceded that a witness could not be required to attend at
321. Chapman v. Maren Elwood College, 225 F.2d 230, 234 (9th Cir.
1955).
322. 362 U.S. 610 (1960).
323. Id. at 611; cf. United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D.
Mass. 1960), where a federal district judge suspended a defendant's sen-
tence on the condition that he would testify against his fellow wrongdoers
and then subpoenaed one of those named by the defendant.
324. 316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963).
INQUISITIONS BY OFFICIALS
some other place than the trial and added that no error had been
committed because the witness, and not the defendant, was de-
prived of his right to counsel. 25
IV. FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE BODIES
Most federal executive or administrative agencies with investiga-
tive subpoena powers can conduct their investigative proceedings
either before a body or an individual official. These proceedings
usually take place before an individual official; however, the inves-
tigative subpoenas of the Federal Petroleum Board and the Pa-
cific Railway Commission were returnable to those agencies as
bodies,3 2 while the subpoenas of the National War Labor Board
were returnable before a panel.2 - Under the Civil Rights Act of
1957, the Civil Rights Commission was required to hold its inves-
tigative hearings either before the Commission itself or, on its au-
thorization, before a "subcommittee of two or more members, at
least one of whom shall be of each major political party."3"
In this instance, the statute limited the role of counsel for sub-
poenaed witnesses to that of "advising them concerning their con-
stitutional rights." '329 Moreover, the statute gave the chairman or
acting chairman of an investigative hearing the power to cen-
sure and exclude counsel for "breaches of order and decorum and
unprofessional ethics."3 The statute further provided that a wit-
ness could obtain a transcript of his testimony at an executive
session only when authorized by the Commission. 3'
It was this legislation that gave rise to Hannah v. Larche, -
the case from which one of the dissenters in Mead Corp.- quoted
at length. The Civil Rights Commission had subpoenaed some vot-
ing registrars and private citizens to a hearing at Shreveport, Loui-
siana. They sought to enjoin the Commission from holding its pro-
posed hearing on the double ground that the Civil Rights Act of
325. Id. at 897.
326. See, e.g., Kilgore Nat'l Bank v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 209 F.2d
557 (5th Cir. 1954); Zinser v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 148 F.2d 993 (5th
Cir. 1945); Genecov v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 146 F.2d 596 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 865 (1945); Graham v. Federal Tender
Bd., 118 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1941).
327. See, e.g., S & W Cafeteria v. Aird, 60 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Tenn.
1945).
328. 71 Stat. 636, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975d(f) (Supp. 1962).
329. 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(c) (1958).
330. 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(d) (1958).
331. 71 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(i) (1958).
332: 363 U.S. 420 (1960), reversing 177 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1959).
333. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 16241, at 21067 (FTC Jan.
3, 1963).
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1957 was unconstitutional and that the Commission's Rules of
Procedure were invalid because they did not accord to those un-
der investigation the rights of apprisal, confrontation, and cross-
examination. A three-judge court held the act constitutional but
the Rules invalid; the Supreme Court sustained both. In so doing,
the Court approved the rules of the FTC and the SEC, which con-
tained double restrictions on the right to counsel.
Once again administrative investigations were compared to grand
jury investigations, although not as strongly as in some cases.
Justices Black and Douglas objected to the comparison, but Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, stated that the com-
parison was made "to show that the rules of this Commission are
not alien to those which have historically governed the procedure
of investigations conducted by agencies in the three major branches
of our Government. .. .
In the three-judge court below, Circuit Judge Wisdom, although
dissenting in part because he felt the Commission's Rules as well
as the Act were both valid, nevertheless distinguished between a
grand jury and the Commission, stating that
the creation of such a commission is of questionable legislative pro-
priety, at best . . . The investigation of specific violations of the law is
for grand juries, not legislative commissions. . . .When a subpoenaed
334. 363 U.S. at 449. But Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion
in which Mr. Justice Black concurred, pointed out the difference between
a grand jury and the Commission:
The grand jury brings suspects before neighbors, not strangers ...
This Commission has no such guarantee of fairness . . . . The mem-
bers cannot be as independent as grand juries because they meet not
for one occasion only; they do a continuing job for the executive and,
if history is a guide, tend to acquire a vested interest in that role
... . The Civil Rights Commission can hold all the hearings it de-
sires; it can adduce testimony from as many people as it likes; it
can search the records and archives for such information it needs to
make an informed report to Congress . . . .But when it summons a
person, accused under affidavit of having violated the federal election
law, to see if the charge is true, it acts in lieu either of a grandjur or of a committing magistrate. The sifting of criminal charges
against people is for the grand jury or for judges or magistrates and
for them alone under our Constitution. In my view no other ac-
cusatory body can be used that withholds the rights of confrontation
and cross-examination from those accused of federal crimes.
Id. at 498-99, 508. During oral argument before the Court, Mr. Justice
Black emphasized the difference between a grand jury and the Commission:
"Do you think it [an investigation by the Commission] is the same as the
work of a grand jury made up of people living in the community? They
sift out the charges to be preferred." Deputy Attorney General Lawrence
E. Walsh pressed the grand jury analogy. Mr. Justice Black responded:
"Again I suggest a difference between investigation by a grand jury com-
posed of persons from the community and an investigation by this Commis-
sion." 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3222 (1960).
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witness accused of a crime may be subjected to trial by exposure, a fact-
finding determination and punishment, he should have the same
rights of notice, confrontation, cross-examination, and all the other
hard-earned-rights embodied in due process that anyone accused of
breaking the law is entitled to when he is tried before a judge .... 3.
In this case all eyes were focused on the rights of those under in-
vestigation to apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination. The
result may have been different had the subpoenaed witnesses at-
tended the scheduled hearing and concentrated their objections
at the proper time on the lack of full representation by counsel.
V. MISCELLANEOUS FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE
AGENCIES
In addition to the more than two dozen executive and adminis-
trative agencies with investigative subpoena powers thus far con-
sidered, there are eleven more such agencies that deserve mention.
They have not entered any court contests with subpoenaed wit-
nesses, and most of them apparently have never published rules
or regulations. In alphabetical order, they are: (1) Board of In-
vestigation created by the Water Carrier Act to investigate various
modes of transportation;33 (2) Bureau of Corporations under a
Commissioner of Corporations in the Department of Commerce and
Labor;337 (3) Commission on Industrial Relations;3" (4) Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations;-, (5) Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, known
as the Hoover Commission;34 (6) Commission to Investigate the
Japanese Attack on Hawaii;34 (7) Investigation Commission es-
tablished by the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935;112 (8) Na-
tional Bituminous Coal Commission set up in the Interior Depart-
ment by the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935;M3 (9)
Railroad Labor Board created by the Transportation Act of 1920;
(10) Temporary National Economic Committee;4 5 and (11)
United States Coal Commission. 46
The legislation for five of these agencies contained compulsory
335. Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816, 831-32 (1959).
336. Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722, §§ 301-04, 54 Stat. 952.
337. Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, § 6, 32 Stat. 827.
338. Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 351, §§ 1-4, 37 Stat. 415.
339. Act of July 10, 1953, ch. 185, § 1-4, 67 Stat. 145.
340. Act of July 10, 1953, ch. 184, §§ 1-10, 67 Stat. 142.
341. H-R.J. Res. 259 of Dec. 23, 1941, ch. 620, 55 Stat. 853.
342. Act of Aug. 29, 1935, ch. 812, § 8, 49 Stat. 972.
343. Act of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 824; § 2, 49 Stat. 992.
344. Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, §§ 304-11, 41 Stat. 470-73.
345. S.J. Res. 300 of June 16, 1938, ch. 456, 52 Stat. 705.
346. Act of Sept 22, 1922, ch. 415, 42 Stat. 1023.
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testimony provisions as well as investigative subpoena powers. The
Bureau of Corporations, the Railway Labor Board, and the United
States Coal Commission had liberal immunity provisions, while the
Commission to Investigate the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
and the Temporary National Economic Committee applied the strict
immunity provisions first codified by the Securities Act of 1933.
The statute establishing the United States Coal Commission made
disobedience of one of its subpoenas or inspection orders an of-
fense punishable "by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by im-
prisonment for not more than one year, or by both such fine and
imprisonment." '347 Refusal to accede to an inspection order of the
Railroad Labor Board is an offense punishable by a penalty of
500 dollars and "each day during any part of which such offense
continues shall constitute a separate offense.3 48 The Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations and the Hoover Commission
had available to them the procedures and penalties for violation of
a congressional subpoena. 9 The penalties were "a fine of not
more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a com-
mon jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve
months." 351
These eleven agencies bring to more than three dozen the num-
ber of executive and administrative agencies that had investigative
subpoena powers, to which number can be added the President to
complete the list. The majority of these agencies are currently
in existence and in the exercise of these powers.
VI. SUMMARY. OF SIMILARITIES AND
DIFFERENCES
Administrative investigations developed patterns of their own
with numerous differences and variations among the different
agencies. These similarities and contrasting differences will be pre-
sented in lettered paragraphs, using the procedures of the CAB as
a basic pattern.
a. Administrative investigations are usually conducted by and
before a single official. Agencies such as the Pacific Railway Com-
mission, the Federal Petroleum Board, and the National War Labor
Board, however, often, and even usually, conducted their investiga-
tive hearings before bodies; and, in the instance of the Civil Rights
Commission, the relevant statute required hearings before a body.
347. Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 412, 42 Stat. 1025.
348. Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 311(a), 41 Stat. 472.
349. Act of July 10, 1953, ch. 185, § 4(a), 67 Stat. 146; Act of July
10, 1953, ch. 184, § 10(a), 67 Stat. 144.
350. 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
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b. Subpoena powers in the head or heads of an administrative
or executive agency are usually delegable and delegated. But in
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland,5' involving the Administrator
of the Wage-and Hour Division of the Labor Department, the
Court held that under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which
made applicable the subpoena provisions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the Administrator was not authorized to dele-
gate his subpoena powers. This result, however, was reversed by
Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950,12 which gave the power
of such delegation to the Secretary of Labor, and Reorganization
Plan No. 8 of 1950,111 which gave a like power of delegation to
the chairman of the FTC. Also, there was some change in the
Court's approach in the later case of Fleming v. Mohmvk Wreck-
ing & Lumber Co.,' where the Court held that the Price Ad-
ministrator could delegate his subpoena powers.
c. Subpoenas usually run from any place in the United States
to any place in the United States. 55 Here there are at least a
half dozen variations, some broader and some more restricted.
The broadest applies to the Commission to Investigate the Jap-
anese Attack of Hawaii; its subpoenas ran to "any place subject to
the civil or military jurisdiction of the United States." There are
four variations applicable to the SEC. Under the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, subpoenas run
to "any place in any State or in any Territory or other place subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States"; 7 under the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939, to "any place in the United States or in any
Territory"; s under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to "any
place in the United States or any State";359 and under the Se-
curities Act of 1933, to "any place in the United States or any
Territory."36 The subpoenas of the NLRB run to "any place in
the United States or any Territory or possession thereof." '' On
351. 315 U.S. 357 (1942).
352. 64 Stat. 1263, 1264.
353. 64 Stat. 1264.
354. 331 U.S. 111 (1947).
355. Cf. FED. R.. CRIM. P. 17(e)(1): "A subpoena requiring the attend-
ance of a witness at a hearing or trial may be served at any place within
the United States."
.356. H.RJ. Res. of Dec. 23, 1941, ch. 620, c (a), 55 Stat. 854.
357. 54 Stat. 853 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(b) (1958); 54 Stat. 842
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(b) (1958); 49 Stat. 831 (1935), 15 U.S.C.§ 79r(c) (1958).
358. 53 Stat. 1174, 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1958).
359. 48 Stat. 899, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1958).
360. 48 Stat. 86, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1958).
361. 49 Stat. 455 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1958).
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the other hand, the subpoenas of the Administrator of the VA are
limited to within 100 miles from the place of hearing; 162 those
of the Secretary of Labor under the United States Employees' Com-
pensation Act, to "within a radius of one hundred miles" ;363 those
of the same official under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act to within the state of the residence of the
witness "and not more than one hundred miles from his place of
residence, unless his lawful mileage and fee for one day's attend-
ance shall first be paid or tendered to him"; 4 and those of the
Civil Rights Commission to the state "wherein the witness is found
or resides or transacts business. '
d. Fees and mileage paid witnesses in administrative investiga-
tions are almost always the same as those that are paid witnesses
in the courts of the United States.3"' The Civil Rights Act of
1957, however, added a provision allowing witnesses who are "so
far removed from their respective residences as to prohibit return
thereto from day to day . . . an additional allowance of $12 per
day for expenses of subsistence, including the time necessarily oc-
cupied in going to and returning from the place of attend-
ance."3 7 The Coast Guard pays up to the amount received by
district court witnesses.368
e. The usual manner of compelling obedience to an adminis-
trative subpoena is by a court enforcement order, disobedience of
which constitutes contempt of court. Indeed, in ICC v. Brim-
son369 the Court indicated that this was the only way to enforce
administrative subpoenas. Nevertheless, there are numerous varia-
tions from the usual pattern. The earliest legislation for adminis-
trative subpoena powers, that relating to taxes in 1864, authorized
362. 72 Stat. 1237 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 3311 (1958); cf. FED. R. CIv. P.45(e): "A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a hearing or
trial may be served at any place within the district, or at any place without
the district that is within 100 miles of the place of the hearing or trial
specified in the subpoena. . ....
363. 39 Stat. 748 (1916), 5 U.S.C. § 780 (1958).
364. 44 Stat. 1437 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 924 (1958).
365. 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(h) (1958).
366. Under 70 Stat. 798 (1956), 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1958), the basic ratefor such witnesses is four dollars a day and eight cents per mile, plus this
provision:
Witnesses who are not salaried employees of the Government and
who are not in custody and who attend at points so far removed from
their respective residence as to prohibit return thereto from day to day
shall be entitled to an additional allowance of $8 per day for expenses
of subsistence including the time necessarily occupied in going to and
returning from the place of attendance ....
367. 71 Stat. 635, 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(j) (1958).
368. 49 Stat. 1383 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 239(0 (1958).
369. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
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assessors to apply for an attachment against a subpoenaed person
as for a contempt. The second act, that relating to the officers and
crews of vessels in 1871, authorized local boards of inspectors to
compel the attendance of subpoenaed witnesses by a process sim-
ilar to that in the federal courts. The Compulsory Testimony Act
of 1893, passed as an amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act, made disobedience of the ICC's subpoenas an offense
punishable by a "fine not less than $100 nor more than $5,000,
or by imprisonment for not more than one year or by both such
fine and imprisonment.""37 The Communications Act of 1934
provided for the same penalty,rrl and similar provisions have be-
come rather frequent. The Federal Trade Commission Act raised
the minimum of the fine from 100 to 1000 dollars. The Federal
Power Act, the Natural Gas Act, and the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 provide for a maximum fine of 1000 dollars or a year's
imprisonment or both; the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 also
adds the costs of prosecution. One who denies the FTC access to
records is subject to a fine of not less than 1,000 dollars nor
more than 5,000 dollars, or imprisonment up to three years or
both. The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the
Hoover Commission could seek to have the penalties for violation
of a congressional subpoena imposed.
f. The variations extend even to the way to apply for court
enforcement of an administrative subpoena. Rule 81 (a) (3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
These rules apply (1) to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony
or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by
an officer or agency of the United States under any statute of the
United States except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the
district court or by order of the court in the proceedings, and (2)
to appeals in such proceedings.
In Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., n involving a subpoena of
the Internal Revenue Service, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held the Rules to be applicable. But in United States v.
Vivian,3 involving a subpoena of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled
otherwise, holding service of process unnecessary because "pyra-
miding summonses on subpoenas serves no useful purpose."' 4
To the extent that the question has arisen, the courts have usually
370. 27 Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
371- 48 Stat 1096 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 409(m) (1958).
372. 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
373. 224 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 953 (1956).
374. Id. at 57.
1963]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:939
been inclined to the simpler procedure followed in the Vivian
case.
375
g. Court enforcement orders of administrative subpoenas have
usually been held to be final and appealable. This contrasts with
court orders enforcing court subpoenas, which are not final and
appealable under Cobbledick v. United States. 6 But, under sec-
tion 7604(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and its prede-
cessors, which permitted application for an attachment against a
subpoenaed person as for a contempt, the courts divided on the
appealability of court enforcement orders. The question reached
the Supreme Court in Davis v. Soia,3 7 but the case was disposed
of on a joint suggestion of mootness.
h. Disobedience of a court enforcement order of an adminis-
trative subpoena has usually been held to constitute a civil con-
tempt. Nevertheless, the First Circuit in Brody v. United States"78
called such disobedience a criminal contempt.
i. Disobedience of an administrative subpoena has not been re-
garded as a contempt at all. However, the second circuit, in
Application of Colton,379 indicated that under section 7604(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 such disobedience might
constitute a contempt.
j. On the rights of subpoenaed persons to counsel in adminis-
trative investigative proceedings, there is such a variance that it is
impossible to state any general practice. Despite the requirement
of section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act that subpoe-
naed persons "be accorded the right to be accompanied, repre-
sented, and advised by counsel," administrative agencies have been
slow to comply. Statutes such as the Export Control Act of 1949
and the Second Decontrol Act of 1947 exempt certain agencies
from various sections, including section 6, of the Administrative
Procedure Act. In the case of the Civil Rights Commission, the
375. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB3, 122 F.2d 450(6th Cir. 1941); Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 692 (10th Cir.1941). A note of the Advisory Committee on Rules to FED. R. Civ. P.
45 states in part:
It [Rule 45] does not apply to the enforcement of subpoenas issued
by administrative officers and commissions pursuant to statutory au-
thority. The enforcement of such subpoenas by the district courts is
regulated by appropriate statutes. Many of these statutes do not place
any territorial limits on the validity of subpoenas so issued, but pro-
vide that they may be served anywhere within the United States ....
376. 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
377. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3415 (June 17, 1963), vacating judgment in Ap-
plication of Davis, 303 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1962).
378. 243 F.2d 378 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
379. 291 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1961).
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applicable statute itself limited the role of counsel for subpoenaed
witnesses. Some executive and administrative agencies " still make
no provision for counsel for subpoenaed witnesses in investigative
hearings. The AEC in its regulations simply provides that the pro-
cedure is to "be such as will best serve the purpose of the hear-
ing." The FCC has a comparable provision; the procedures to be
followed are to "be such as in the opinion of the Commission will
best serve the purposes of such proceeding." Some agencies, such
as the CAB, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Internal Reve-
nue Service, and the SEC still limit counsel for subpoenaed wit-
nesses to ear-whispering. It was this restrictive practice that the
FTC ameliorated in January, 1963 in Mead Corp."1 The CAB,
the Internal Revenue Service, and the SEC also limit subpoenaed
witnesses in their choice of counsel. Only one agency, the Federal
Power Commission, goes beyond the requirements of section 6(a)
of the Administrative Procedure Act; its regulations accord the
right of representation by counsel to voluntary as well as sub-
poenaed witnesses.
k. Beginning with the Securities Act of 1933, many statutes
have supplied executive and administrative agencies with compul-
sory testimony provisions under which a subpoenaed individual
first has to claim his privilege against self-incrimination to obtain
immunity from prosecution. But some agencies, such as the Com-
modity Exchange Commission, the FTC,m2 and the ICC, still
have the older form under which a subpoenaed individual obtains
immunity, without claiming his privilege. The Federal Maritime
Commission administers two acts, one of which has the newer type
of compulsory testimony provision and the other the older. The
Coast Guard, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the
United States Tariff Commission, and the VA have no compulsory
testimony provision. The Agriculture Department administers six
acts, four contain the older form of compulsory testimony provi-
sion, and two contain no compulsory testimony provision at all.
The Labor Department and the NLRB administer seven acts, three
contain the older form of compulsory testimony provision, an-
other contains the newer form, and three contain no compul-
sory testimony provision at all.
1. Section 6(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides
that a subpoenaed person, instead of obtaining a copy of his testi-
380. E.g., the Agriculture Department, the Coast Guard, the Federal
Aviation Agency, the Labor Department, the NLRB, and the VA.
381. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 16241 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963).
382. 38 Stat. 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958).
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mony, "may for good cause be limited to inspection of the official
transcript of his testimony." This has become a general provision.
In administering the Export Control Act of 1949, however, the
Commerce Department has provided without qualification that wit-
nesses are entitled to copies of transcripts of their own testimony.
Yet in all this maze, at least one thing seems certain-if a sub-
poenaed person wants to be fully represented by counsel, lie should
be entitled to such representation.
VII. FEDERAL INQUISITIONAL TREND
There is no doubt that the federal grand jury has a permanence
that the beginning provision of the fifth amendment protects: "No
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury
. "383 Moreover, the Supreme Court has always supported
the grand jury in words of ringing praise. In a recent case, Wood
v. Georgia,3 involving a conviction for contempt of court of a
Georgia sheriff for out-of-court statements questioning the advisa-
bility of a grand jury investigation into block voting by Negroes,
the Court, in reversing the conviction, referred to the grand jury
as a
primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppres-
sive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of
standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be
an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge
is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or
by malice and personal ill will .... 38 5
Two terms earlier, in Stirone v. United States, 386 the Court re-
versed a conviction because it was based on evidence not within
the grand jury's charge. A few years before that, in Costello v.
United States, the Court held that a grand jury could base an
indictment solely on hearsay testimony, stating that "in this
country . . . the grand jury has convened as a body of laymen,
free from technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no
one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special
favor . . . . ,,3s' Furthermore, the Supreme Court's estimate of
383. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
384. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
385. Id. at 390.
386. 361 U.S. 212 (1960). In Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749
(1962), the Court reversed convictions in six cases for contempt of Con-
gress because the indictments did not aver the subject under congressional
committee inquiry.
387. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
388. Id. at 362. In the leading case of Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887),
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the grand jury is historically correct. This body was essential to
the development of our accusatorial method in the treatment of
deviants. Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, cor-
rectly saw trial by jury as raising the people "to the bench of
judges" and investing them "with the direction of society." 9
Nevertheless, the federal trend, and the modem trend generally,
is-in the direction of inquisitions by officials. Some sixty federal
acts, half of them passed in the decade which began with the year
1933, iave given investigative subpoena powers to executive and
administrative officials. The grand jury is looked upon with grow-
ing disfavor. It is regarded as too cumbersome for our increasingly
complex and more administratively managed society. It has been
thought of as a rubber stamp for the prosecutor, yet it has been
critically referred to for just the opposite reason by the Civil Rights
Commission."'
In .i ddition -to the modem inquisitional trend, such deci-
sions .as..,Shapiro v. United States,39 where the Supreme Court set
up its required records exception to the fifth amendment's right
the, Court, in holding that-the charges in an indictment could not be broad-
ened by amendment, quoted from a charge to a grand jury by Mr. Justice
Field, which stated in part:
In' this c6untrj, from the popular character of our institutions, there
has seldom been any contest between the government and the citizen
which required the existence of the grand jury as a protection against
oppressive action of the government. Yet the institution was adopted in
this country... and is designed as a means, not only of bringing to
trial persons accused of public offenses upon just grounds, but also as a
means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether
it come from government, or be prompted by partisan passion or
private enmity. No person shall be required according to the funda-
mental law of the country, except in the cases mentioned, to answer for
any of the higher crimes unless this body, consisting of not less than
sixteen nor more than twenty-three good and lawful men, selected
from the body of the district, shall declare upon careful deliberation,
under the solemnity of an oath, that there is good reason for this
accusation and trial.
Id. at 11.
389. 1 DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 282-83 (Reeve text as
rev. by Bowen, Bradley ed. 1945).
390.
13. Since [18 U.S.C.] Section 242, the principal criminal Federal civil
rights act, defines only a misdemeanor, prosecution can be instituted
by information (a sworn statement setting out the specific charges
against the defendant) as well as by grand jury indictment. The former
method avoids the delay and the hazard of one more hostile jury, in-
volved in a presentment to a grand jury, and allows the facts to be
brought to the attention of the affected community in a public trial.
An information has been used by the Department of Justice only
once and then successfully.
1961 CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISsION, REPORT ON JUSTICE I 10-I1.
391. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
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of silence; Brown v. Walker,392 Brown v. United States, 3 3 and
other decisions, in which the Court sustained the validity of coin-
pulsory testimony acts; Rogers v. United States,394 where the
Court announced its waiver doctrine of one's right of silence; Mar-
cello v. Bonds,395 where the Court held that a special inquiry of-
ficer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service could take the
dual role of prosecutor and judge; Levine v. United States,399
where the Court permitted a federal district judge to clear the
court room and question a grand jury witness; Goldberg v. Bat-
tles,397 where the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sanc-
tioned the delegation of the conduct of an investigational hearing
under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 to an employee of the Department of Justice; and United
States v. Standard Oil Co.,398 where the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit condoned the conduct of a prosecutor in sub-
poenaing witnesses to his office and questioning them in private,
indicate that to a certain extent the accusatorial method developed
by English-speaking peoples has been replaced by the inquisitional
system developed, and in recent decades exploited, on the main-
land of Europe.
(Parts 11 and III of this Article will be published in Volume 48.)
392. 161 U.s. 591 (1896).
393. 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
394. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
395. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
396. 362 U.S. 610 (1960).
397. 196 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Pa. 1961), afrd per curiam, 299 F.2d 937(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 717 (1962).
398. 316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963).
